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    The Simplest Suffering System
    By Sascha Vongehr | June 18th 2012 02:28 AM | 95 comments | Print | E-mail | Track Comments
    About Sascha

    Dr. Sascha Vongehr [风洒沙] studied phil/math/chem/phys in Germany, obtained a BSc in theoretical physics (electro-mag) & MSc (stringtheory)...

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    The simple harmonic oscillator (SHO), the Schwarzschild solution black hole (SS-BH), the hydrogen atom: These are simple, basic physics systems, well defined, ideal, symmetric models, and indispensable for the progress of physical science. Brain and consciousness studies are, via physics being fundamentally epistemology of conscious observers, closely related or perhaps even sub-fields of physics. They use certain simple systems like the simplest integrate and fire neuron for example, the feedback loop. All are theoretical models yet as well correspond very closely to physical realizations.


    We cannot satisfactorily “explain” phenomenal feeling in any ‘mechanistic’ way. We get hung up with regress, with whether real suffering is suffering of suffering. However, we can create physical systems that we correlate suffering with (see below) and will likely be able to do so unknowingly soon. If you care about ethics and want to fight today’s as well as prevent future speciesism, it should be a duty to demand and work toward a widely acceptable clarification of these issues.


    Philosophical debate leads nowhere if it is not goal oriented. Making something focuses best – nothing verification transcendent ever pops up in stuff you can sell. We need to construct/define and investigate the properties of the Simplest Sufferer (SS).


     

    We make Suffering Systems

    A mechanical arm is wired up to retract if touching a hot surface. It is connected to a light that turns from green to red when retracting. This system is not correlated with suffering, because we can wire it to push further instead of retracting or to let a different color appear, all without changing the wiring inside of what we may arbitrarily identify as its brain. All its “suffering” rests entirely in our interpretation; none is necessarily ascribed to the system, thought of as somehow internal to the system that we think “counts”.


    (Warning: If you cannot stand thought experiments involving chainsaws, daughters, and perverted sexual fetishes without grasping a rosary, this article may soon offend you. I recommend enjoying being offended, and then enjoy questioning why it offended you. You are welcome.)


    However, we can make systems that we do correlate internal suffering with, ascribe internal suffering to. For example, you can take a human sperm cell and an egg, implant them perhaps into a primate womb, say kept in a vat, say a woman, and so on, all physical steps manipulating matter, ending up with a "cute little baby", a system that can be made to make sounds like “mama” while it looks like as if it smiles – you may insist it really smiles. You can put this system into a soundproof container that has medical equipment supplying fluids containing nutrients and oxygen and so on, and hook baby up to electrical wires. You can attach a green lamp as well as a red one, and a sensor that detects screaming and crying inside, distinguishing it from giggling. And now you can wire it all up so that pressing a switch will make the red light come on.


    This is a physical system, and you can hang it on a Christmas tree and wire it up so that it flashes its beautiful red light whenever people gather around and sing a Christmas carol to go to heaven. You can wire it up to your blog and let people donate money to charity, keeping that webcam on the red light indicating that donations are arriving until the red light burns out.


    Artificial intelligence (AI) implemented on physical computers that partially interconnect with biological neural tissue is progressing in leaps and bounds. We wire it up to look cute to make us feel well, but we should think about which kinds of systems suffer! How do we know that not that green light on your iphone or Siri saying “How are you” is equivalent to a hundred Christmas carols sung around my special tree?


    We need to seriously think about constructing the Simplest Sufferer, the simplest system which we consent to correlate suffering with. We need to make it and will make it, although some teenagers perhaps ten years down the road will download the subroutines for fun and make them scream an internal scream so painful as has never been felt before in this universe.


    Getting Started

    What are the vital differences between flailing mechanical arms and a tortured child? One difference is that a system that we correlate suffering with has an internal representation of the environment and of parts of itself (though most “parts of self” are just parts of the environment of the “brain” – this is why philosophy about (personal) identity is relevant). A physical re-re-presentation is no more privileged than the original physical pattern. The mere electrical signals that transport pain are in a sense already a representation. Nobody has argued satisfactorily for that data compression (coarse graining via cognitive selection processes) during a transformation (here re-presentation) correlates to suffering. There must be something, some X added to the mere representation (regardless whether static pattern or process, the latter being a pattern in space-time). One popular suggestion is to focus on recursion, because such is not already in the initial physical situation or in any mere re-presentation. Recursive would be the mentioned representation of parts of the system itself or a representation of the suffering itself.


    The bare system is already present in the original physical situation, so a representation of “I” may not be as vital as often supposed. “I” can be dissolved via hallucinogens while suffering stays. Suffering may require an internal representation that includes a sort of ‘neural correlate’ of the suffering itself without this being a mere regress error.


    How to Proceed

    One should think closely along a physical implementation, about actually making a system that suffers. We need the equivalent of an arm that can go forth or retract (A = 0 or 1), an output like “red”and “green”, and a brain where such variables have representations (say via neurons being in different states). The task is: Add to this internal representation, namely via additional outside variables (e.g. seeing the red output) as well as inside variables (e.g. re-representation of combined representations). In the beginning it will be quite obvious that the internal representation is isomorphic to computations that perform entirely different tasks. Initially, merely swapping red with green will prove that.


    The difficult task is to add to the internal representations, to the language of thought perhaps (LOT), though I can suffer without logical thoughts. We need to add to the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in such a way as to ensure an internal “wiring” that creates interdependence between parts on the re-presentation level that cannot be mapped one to one to something entirely different. If you reject such as silly and impossible, you basically are of the opinion that one may go ahead and physically torture a child – there is no suffering related with it according to your opinion.


    A Quantum Connection?

    We will have a hard time to construct the Simplest Sufferer. We may never all agree on that a particular thing must be related to suffering. As soon as somebody suggests one, we will make it, see the neurons flashing, and feel that this could as well be a randomly thrown together decoration of a Christmas tree. The Simplest Sufferer may crucially involve entanglement with other potential representations. The entanglement between potential actualizations is the core of quantum mechanics.


    The suffering system is perhaps in many worlds in a vital way. It is that interdependence between potential worlds which we cannot artificially construct simply by wiring up a (simple) representation. The representation must act and thus itself “enter” parallel worlds in order for phenomenal suffering to supervene on the entanglement of the worlds it finds itself in. A quantum connection, yes, but not necessarily in a way that can just be switched on via adding a few quantum gates into the physical representation (although I neither reject this ingredient as perhaps also necessary out of hand).


    In the quantum solipsism description, the child suffers because you are in the superposition of all these possibilities. The part of you that observes to make the child suffer is the flipside of the part of you that is the child.


    If you find these thoughts outrageous, stop the moral outrage and start constructing the Simplest Sufferer so that I will be proven wrong. If we cannot construct the Simplest Sufferer, the psychopaths will have had it all along.


    Remarks

    Why not "simplest enjoyer" instead of simplest sufferer? Because joy is a form of suffering; suffering via pain is easier to consider; and the project can be supported via arguing ethical necessity. We cannot add or subtract from totality. Avoidance of suffering is what you want to read; I find myself having obeyed and written this.

    Comments

    The representation must act and thus itself “enter” parallel worlds in order for phenomenal suffering to supervene on the entanglement of the worlds it finds itself in.
    Sounds like a job for the Fairy-Winged Qualia to me.


    vongehr
    Nice - this picture is close to what I have in mind. Of course, it is "wrong" in the sense of that there is no 'mechanism' that 'produces' the phenomenon from the worlds, because in a fundamental description, there is no time for such to happen, as time is similarly emergent on that level. However, in some sort of dual description where we try to describe physics, we may be forced to presuppose certain concepts to efficiently communicate, and in some of those descriptions, the worlds need to "interact/interfere" in order for the phenomenal to be ascribed. This will become important in the discussion with creationists! If you want to create a phenomenal world, it must be like that, and if it is like that, the creator decouples from the description - the creator-possibilities interfere destructively as to let the creation be seen as having already existed independently anyway. That there is no fundamental creator can thus be proven and it does not rely on what could as well be a planted fossil record, namely biological evolution.
    Gerhard Adam
    Why not "simplest enjoyer" instead of simplest sufferer?
    I'm afraid these distinctions aren't specific enough, because it appears to be too focused on physical pain.  However, we already know that's insufficient since the signals can be prevented from reaching the brain, so consequently we can't argue that pain is the cause of suffering.   How do we classify people with conditions like congenital analgesia, or masochists whose ideas of suffering may be the opposite of others?

    It appears that the root of suffering has little or no bearing on what occurs in the physical body in terms of absolutely meaning.
    vongehr
    I'm afraid these distinctions aren't specific enough, because it appears to be too focused on physical pain.
    I have not been clear that it is not about physical pain? And about "distinctions aren't specific"; well the next sentence already is "Because joy is a form of suffering", so I claim no distinction.

    The message that I am hiding here may have again completely gone under the radar, ha ha. Let me ask you something: How would I have written it differently in case I felt that there is no simplest suffering system at all while secretly torturing immigrant children in one of the many West-Hollywood gated community dungeons?
    Thor Russell
    "Joy is a form of suffering"  Someone is obviously meant to ask what that is supposed to mean. It sounds like defining a circle to include four sided regular polygons.
    Thor Russell
    Gerhard Adam
    But that's my point.  When you use the word torture you're obviously implying some form of pain, albeit psychologically at the least.

    After all, the whole point of your examples is to illustrate that something terrible is being done, and consequently we certainly don't expect that these children you're referring to are "suffering" because they are enjoying themselves.  In other words, your examples of children are specifically intended to elicit the kind of response associated with physical pain [or perhaps even psychological torture].

    I don't see it as fundamentally different than if you had invoked vivisection on live animals.  After all, this was the thinking at one time regarding the "suffering" of animals.

    However if it isn't about physical pain, then what is "suffering"?  More specifically, what do you even mean by the word? 
    Quentin Rowe

    Suffering is such a loaded word, it implies pain all by itself. If I substitute 'suffering' with the word 'experience', then it makes perfect sense to me. Pleasure or Pain.

    A Simplest Sufferer test seems a valid, if somewhat ambitious way, to explore the fundamental nature of consciousness. Seeing as you understand QM to be fundamental, then it makes sense for the answer to at least emerge from QM. For me, it's a stretch to see any connection with a quantum mechanism, though you admit this tenuousness yourself.

    How does pain serve from an evolutionary point of view? Essentially, pain helps us survive by alerting us to life threatening injuries. Thus it is the threat of ceasing to exist that we care about, which can be extended to the tribe, group, or whole of humanity if we wish.

    Yes, I'm aware that in a multiverse, ceasing to exist is by definition impossible, so let's assume the experience of pain requires this misconception as part of it's definition.

    Imagine the robots have won and taken over the world. Do they equip themselves with a pain system, or do they instead rely on an infallible infrastructure to fix injuries. If they were motivated enough to wage a war with humans, then they must understand about survival strategies, short and long term. Whether they are calculated about surviving or not, the evolutionary mechanisms care not, and apply to robots regardless of their intentions. (This is complicated somewhat by 'motivation' and 'pain' being equally ill defined.)

    Robots would certainly equip themselves with a damage feedback system. Your proposal is exploring at what point this feedback becomes perceived as pain.

    This comment explores connecting pain with an erroneous concept of 'ceasing to exist', which we know, via the multiverse idea, doesn't really occur. This suggests that pain, nor joy, exist. They are a construct (choice?) after the fact from an entirely neutral situation.

    Gerhard Adam
    All this suggests more word games rather than insight. 
    Your proposal is exploring at what point this feedback becomes perceived as pain.
    There's no need.  Feedback is only relevant when it conveys useful information.  Whether one wishes to call that pain, joy, or nothing doesn't particularly matter.  If we explore biological systems we find far more nuance.  Pain is useful to convey injury, but it is also shut off, when it becomes overloaded.  Consciousness itself [i.e. losing it], may be involved in determining how much sensory information is too much.
    This comment explores connecting pain with an erroneous concept of 'ceasing to exist', which we know, via the multiverse idea, doesn't really occur.
    This is where the word games come in.  Of course it occurs.  I "cease to exist" the moment I am unaware of myself.  Everything else falls in the domain of someone else's experience.
    Quentin Rowe
    There's no need. Feedback is only relevant when it conveys useful information. Whether one wishes to call that pain, joy, or nothing doesn't particularly matter...

    Agreed. But that is my point. Just like any long term stimulus it becomes meaningless over time, and needs contrast and change to be of use. I'm proposing the meaning is overlayed onto a neutral event, and that pain is one meaning among many.

    Whether it be Sascha's mechanical arm scratching over a hot surface, or a complex 'live' biological system under torture, the problem is neutral from a universal QM point of view. It's just circuits.

    It looks like Sasha, via his Simplest Sufferer proposal, is really attempting to address a base definition of consciousness.

    This is where the word games come in. Of course it occurs. I "cease to exist" the moment I am unaware of myself. Everything else falls in the domain of someone else's experience.

    You clearly do not understand the multiverse concept. This comment reveals the exact misconception I address. If you argue instead that MV is load of wallop, then I could understand your point of view.

    You have a point with the word-games though. Now I understand why Sascha keeps referring to Mr W. ;-)

    Gerhard Adam
    You clearly do not understand the multiverse concept.
    I'm not sure anyone else does either, but ... in any case.  Every time I hear about it, I get the same feeling I get when people talk to me about reincarnation.
    vongehr
    It looks like Sasha, via his Simplest Sufferer proposal, is really attempting to address a base definition of consciousness.
    OK - here you got my hidden message, but
    You clearly do not understand the multiverse concept. This comment reveals the exact misconception I address.
    seems a lot like it is you who misunderstands the "multiverse" concept. I guess you mean "many worlds"; in any case, I do not think that "ceasing to exist" has anything to do with the issue at hand.

    I am again struck by how nonchalantly people take a call to be practically meaningful and turn it into yet another wordplay.
    Quentin Rowe
    I am again struck by how nonchalantly people take a call to be practically meaningful and turn it into yet another wordplay.

    Now that's funny! Both you and Gerhard spend a great deal of time playing with words, mostly to good effect thankfully. In fact, I'll take it as a compliment, thank you. Playing is good - no need to get uptight about it.

    "Ceasing to exist", particularly the fear of it, has everything to do with pain. I'm just following logic. Pain is a conditioned response to injury, honed over the millenia. I understand that you choose pain over joy in your proposal. It is because we know from personal experience, that if we try to harm ourselves pain is so persuasive. It makes for a more clear cut dialogue. But clearly, 'pain' is not the issue here - it's a bright red herring. The experience of pain is.

    Still, the problem remains - a mechanical arm with feedback to a box is fundamentally no different than a biological system with feedback to a brain. They are both merely physical systems. You articulate this in your article, but we are back to the age old qualia blah blah discussion, which is well thrashed out I believe. Gerhard states that the meaning is irrelevant, but I take the view, that from the point of view of the system, the meaning is all. How may a system, great or small, store, hold or conceive of meaning seems a good avenue to explore.

    You explore QM as a possibly providing a mechanism for the 'experience' because you guess, quite reasonably, that seeing as QM is fundamental, here lies an answer(?). Despite all this playing with ideas, you still come up short. That's ok though, this is an exploration after all.

    Gerhard, I notice in your many comments about consciousness, you address it from a human-centric level. This is entirely valid, mostly because we can directly compare our own experience. In particular, you seem to focus on conscious awareness. But awareness can go beyond a human conscious experience.

    How is an electron 'aware' that it has interacted? - Its energy changes. How is a circuit 'aware' that a switch has been thrown - Its state changes. How is a human aware that the the colour green exists? - by the fact that there are other colours to compare. I conclude from this that awareness requires contrast and change. It's arguable whether these examples constitute a definition of base 'awareness', let alone consciousness. They become more significant if one takes into account the 'totality' view offered by Sasha. In this context, focusing on change and contrast may provide a way through.

    For me, it is deeply significant that a property of a multiverse is that any change, any decision I make, effectively changes my universe. Now if that happens to be a Level1 Tegmark universe (infinite galaxies in all directions), then by making a decision, you effectively 'transport' yourself to a vastly remote location in that universe. Of course, I don't believe that there is some superluminal-spooky-action-to-a-distant-location going on. That is just an artifact of how states are mapped out into an infinite volume of space. If you don't like this property, then it's time to decide what kind of universe you think we live in.

    Decisions merely steer us through all the states available within 'totality'. Does one state have a bias for for another state? At a QM level, no. It's neutral. It's this dumb blank neutrality we find so difficult to deal with. It's the undisturbed pool, the empty void. Giving it meaning simply disturbs it.

    I agree with you Quentin about looking into biological evolution and the reasons consciousness and experience came into existence in the first place. I suppose from this point of view, "feelings" are what successful reproducers heeded.

    I can't say I agree with your interpretation of quantum mechanics giving all possible outcomes equal existence, though. I know many-worlds has had trouble with the born rule and how 'probabilities' should be defined, etc., but I think in the end there has to be some kind of "normalized measure" that will allow wave-function amplitude to correspond with 'amount of existence.'

    Quentin Rowe
    I can't say I agree with your interpretation of quantum mechanics giving all possible outcomes equal existence, though...
    Well, Sasha is suggesting that I'm getting my multiverses mixed up with my manyworlds. So I'm not confident in getting to that level of detail. But, seeing as that never stopped me speaking generalities, I will continue anyhow.

    The way I view it, all the possible outcomes and combinations of outcomes make up a totality, the boundary of which may or may not go beyond Sasha's QM definition of such a totality. Either way, I'm assuming a QM physical totality.

    We all know we have feelings, thoughts and emotions, which add up to 'experience' in general. For me, anyone who attempts to explain these away as irrelevant or just some side effect of the physical mechanisms required to 'carry' these experiences, is really relegating life experience to pornography.

    I'm exploring the approach that these qualia and the physical events required to allow them to manifest are inseparable. Any feeling, emotion&thought will always be found upon investigation down to any level to have a matching physical mechanism that wil be seen as the 'cause'. Every thought has a nervous impulse, a chemical exchange, a quantum entanglement. Physical, pure and simple. In fact, it's so simple we appear to be blind to it. I'm repeating what many have said before in many ways - that qualia and physical are one and the same - not separate.

    Now, when explored in the context of a QM totality, the potential of this approach shows promise. At the QM level, all states are equal from the totality point of view. This is equal existence to all outcomes because at this level there is only one outcome - totality. Individual outcomes only makes sense in a cause-effect spacetime universe, which is the view, the partial view you get from within a totality.

    The decisions you make as you interact with your environment, with your partial and limited view, seem to have probabilities associated with them, because they are partial. This is where the fun&complexity come from - the partial view. At the QM level, the outcomes are wave-like and precisely mathematical because the systems are simple, and easily overlap due to being more or less indistinguishable. But at the human level, the decisions you make, and the decisions of all the other partial players you interact from within this totaliy - all these decisions are contained in the totality. And they all manifest in some kind of physical action.

    So what is a decision then, other than simply change. A reshuffle of the QM deck. A new universe. Every possible combination of change is within totality. From this I could argue that consciousness is simply change, or newness, or constantly choosing. Is it consciousness that defines the order we stack the outcomes in? Does consciousness follow the ordering prescribed by entropy, or is entropy a construct of a limited and partial point of view?

    Not quite as precise as Sascha's, but hey, this isn't my day job!

    Gerhard Adam
    The way I view it, all the possible outcomes and combinations of outcomes make up a totality, the boundary of which may or may not go beyond Sasha's QM definition of such a totality.
    ... I don't see how this makes any difference to any aspect of this discussion.  For every instance of torturing a child, there would be a corresponding world where such an interaction is not torture.  Perhaps it even invokes joy.  The point is that when one includes all possibilities, then one must include all the counter-vailing possibilities that negate the original premise as well.  So, in one world a stab wound may be painful, in another it may be pleasurable.  So, what's the point? 

    We still end up with exactly nothing with which to lay claim to any particular ethical position beyond the actualized world we inhabit [or experience].  In other words, it would appear that every possible outcome is also balanced to produce exactly the same reaction in terms of our ethical or conscious perspective. 
    Quentin Rowe

    I'm don't understand why Sascha pins his hopes for a SS on ethics. That's why I side-step ethics in this case. Your thoughts are very insightful, but to me skirt the question 'can a machine feel?'

    In rejecting ethics as a way to explore a SS, I'm exploring other ideas instead.

    Sascha, as he's inclined to do, spells it out clearly - most of the answers are within his article. He shows that mechanical versus biological are the same case, so we've got that issue sorted.

    I can see my thoughts aren't helping you much. Can I ask you instead (genuinely curious) how ethics, or whether someone suffers or not, help us understand his underlying quest for a base definition of consciousness?

    Gerhard Adam
    Can I ask you instead (genuinely curious) how ethics, or whether someone suffers or not, help us understand his underlying quest for a base definition of consciousness?
    In my view, the question of consciousness is incomplete and fails to be properly defined in terms of what we mean by it.  I'm assuming that the discussion is actually about conscious awareness and not simply consciousness.  Therefore if the issue is one of awareness, then it raises the question of why we would examine unconscious processes to generate a definition of consciousness. 

    In other words, is suffering always and only the product of conscious awareness?  How about joy?  Are these mental states that require us to be aware or are they largely unconscious?  Oh certainly if we draw our attention to them, we can rationalize some sort of explanation as to what we're feeling, but generally our feelings are not subject to consciousness.

    As a result, this raises the question as to why I should care how a machine is wired, because in the end I'm simply contriving to construct a physical model of what I imagine feelings are.  In my view, this is simply nonsense.

    When you enjoy music, or a book, or a picture ... what feelings do you have?  Are they conscious? 

    My point is that we can map the brain with as much detail as you like, and you could wire a machine to duplicate it to the finest degree.  In the end, the machine will still not have the feelings you had, because even you don't know what they are.  The machine is simply going through the motions.

    Ironically, in this attempt to define consciousness as a purely physical process, it takes us full circle to where we end up concluding that we are little more than machines ourselves.  After all, isn't the point of having a red/green light a mechanistic variation of mirror neurons?  Are we truly going to rationalize this by saying that since I can't know what someone else is feeling, then we can behave as if they're all zombies, and there is no distinction?

    As a result, I don't see this as advancing the definition of consciousness.  I see it as a regression.
    Quentin Rowe
    Wow, Sasha sure has tossed a cat among the pigeons - I can see why they call it the 'hard problem'.
    In my view, the question of consciousness is incomplete and fails to be properly defined in terms of what we mean by it.

    Agreed. Particularly, the issue of awareness versus consciousness. Are they one and the same?

    Imagine if someone were to render me unable to feel pain via a drug, but I remained fully awake and lucid. Then they proceeded to painlessly remove various body parts. I'm pretty sure I would suffer. If they knocked me out first, then no suffering. If I died because of the injuries, no suffering. Yet all the actions of the perpetrator are physically real. From the qualia point of view, it's the awareness that counts. From the qualia point of view, the detail of how we perceive the pain, the real physical mechanism behind it matters not one tot. Anyway you look at it, it's the awareness that counts. Awareness equals, or is required for, an experience.

    As a result, this raises the question as to why I should care how a machine is wired, because in the end I'm simply contriving to construct a physical model of what I imagine feelings are. In my view, this is simply nonsense.

    This is why I have suggested just assuming that any experience requires a physical mechanism. Just reverse your underlying assumption. In this sense, the arm can suffer, but only if there is complexity enough in it to 'construct' an awareness of suffering. Such a model obviously exists - you and I are just two examples. What's so difficult to grasp here? - I know I haven't elucidated on the details, (or the spectrum - I think you do this much better than I), but once again, we have endless physical examples.

    My point is that we can map the brain with as much detail as you like, and you could wire a machine to duplicate it to the finest degree. In the end, the machine will still not have the feelings you had, because even you don't know what they are. The machine is simply going through the motions.

    If the machine is physically identical to you, 'to the finest degree', then you know exactly how it is feeling. It is you, after all. By the way, if you wired it as you imply, it would be biological.

    Ironically, in this attempt to define consciousness as a purely physical process...

    Who is attempting to define consciousness as purely physical? I don't believe anyone here is suggesting that at all. Perhaps there's something you need to let go of, but it's up to you to figure out what.

    Gerhard Adam
    This is why I have suggested just assuming that any experience requires a physical mechanism. Just reverse your underlying assumption. In this sense, the arm can suffer, but only if there is complexity enough in it to 'construct' an awareness of suffering.
    That's the problem I have with it.  The arm cannot suffer.  The arm can merely "report" sensory data back to an organ that does the "suffering".  This is precisely why the brain can perceive pain from limbs that aren't even present [phantom limb syndrome].
    Awareness equals, or is required for, an experience.
    Yes, but it is also important to distinguish the scenario you've described where the suffering strictly occurs from an abstract perspective.  In other words, if you feel no pain, then the "suffering" you were describing is a result of a particular mental perspective and not due to any particular sensory input.  It's like the fear many people have regarding shark attacks.  On one level it's the attack itself, on the other it's the thought of being eaten [i.e. food for some other creature]. 

    Yet. there's another problem with the concept of experience, because there's no reason to believe that the brain isn't fully capable of integrating information gleaned unconsciously, thereby extending "experience".  Is it then reasonable to claim that such experiences aren't real simply because we aren't consciously aware that they occurred? 
    Quentin Rowe
    In other words, if you feel no pain, then the "suffering" you weredescribing is a result of a particular mental perspective and not dueto any particular sensory input.
    Well, yes, as in the example I gave. I feel no pain, but can see that my limbs are being removed. I know I would suffer in this case. I know because I can see via my visual (read physical/eyes) sensory feedback. I think blue-green takes this view also.

    If there is no sensory input, direct or indirect, then this could only be self induced suffering.

    This overlaps a case explored by Sascha on the nature of light: (loosely speaking) If the photons haven't reached you, then it hasn't happened.
    Gerhard Adam
    I feel no pain, but can see that my limbs are being removed. I know I would suffer in this case.
    Actually you don't.  This is a variation of the "brain in a vat" type problem, where I could simply be inducing you to hallucinate that these events were occurring.  However, I would agree that you are suffering.  My disagreed comes from considering that there has to be any physical involvement whatsoever, which is my claim ... all suffering origins solely in the brain.
    If the photons haven't reached you, then it hasn't happened.
    Of course, it's happened.  There's a difference between becoming aware versus an event simply not happening.  If we receive the Sun's photons seven minutes later, then they must have already left (i.e. they happened) in order for us to pick them up.  Now if the Sun were to go out, then we wouldn't be immediately aware of it, but the event would certainly have happened, because it would be triggering the photons [or lack thereof] for us to perceive.
    Quentin Rowe

    You are still missing the point about qualia. And for terminologies sake, I'm equating 'experience' and 'qualia' in case you are meaning something different.

    In both the above cases, you reveal (again) that you firmly believe in a universe that is 'out there', where as I don't. So this is why we could discuss this until our column is one character wide, and still get nowhere. I'm not saying right or wrong here, but I am wondering if you are aware of the nature of our 180 degree opposed views. Same street, but you're heading west, I'm heading east.

    In both QM and GR, it is fundamental that light is the messenger of 'reality'. Your view clashes with this fact, so you are going to have to figure out how to marry this up.

    If I experience any scenario as a brain set up in a vat, via whatever physical manipulation, then from the qualia point of view my experience is my awareness, regardless of the physical mechanism behind it. If I am never made aware I am a brain in a vat, then the physical set up matters not to me.

    There is no clash here - the fundamental 'rule' I propose still stands. But only if you accept qualia as 'real'. And bear in mind Sacha's quest - it is in qualia where suffering is given life.

    Quentin Rowe
    Yet. there's another problem with the concept of experience, becausethere's no reason to believe that the brain isn't fully capable ofintegrating information gleaned unconsciously, thereby extending"experience".  Is it then reasonable to claim that such experiencesaren't real simply because we aren't consciously aware that theyoccurred?
    The short answer is 'yes'. If you are unconscious of it, then how can you claim to have experienced it?

    I believe the brain does integrate how you say, though. I'm pretty sure such states make up at least part of our experience. This may come through as intuition, emotion, confidence, or what ever. A physical state for every experience. It backs up what I'm saying. Qualia and physical are one and the same.



    Gerhard Adam
    If you are unconscious of it, then how can you claim to have experienced it?
    ... because that's the nature of experience.  I seriously doubt that most people "consciously" acquire experience.  They don't approach something and willfully determine that they are now going to partake in acquiring an experience.

    Even if we didn't want to be that absolutely about it, there is no reason to require that experiences are consciously acquired in any case.  The phrase you used ["you claim"] is an unnecessary qualifier, because I don't need to claim anything in order to have acquired knowledge and/or experience.
    A physical state for every experience.
    In this case, I know what you mean, but I have to disagree.  I believe that we often acquire experiences by proxy [i.e. simply watching others experience something], which is often then incorporated into our own learning.  As a result, we place far more credence on visual learning and observation, which also leads to the notion of "false experiences" when we engage in things like television, etc.  I'm not suggesting that people can't differentiate between Star Trek and the "real world", but it does become almost impossible, when the media portrays something that we perceive as being "truthful".  It invariably is accepted as truth and becomes a part of our experience, even if we recognize that we didn't directly participate in it. 
    Quentin Rowe
    [i.e. simply watching others experience something]

    This is a physical mechanism.

    Thor Russell
    Your idea that qualia and the physical are the same is called anomalous monism I believe?http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/anomalous-monism/ 
    It sounds interesting, have you studied the literature much?
    Thor Russell
    Quentin Rowe

    What, me? Study the literature? I'm just makin' this up as I go along... ;-)

    Thanks for the great link, Thor. It's quite a bundle, so I'm gonna read it more thoroughly and see if it's my line of thinking. Probably first point of departure is the cause-affect argument, but I'm not quite sure yet.

    Ok, this is in reply to your response to my last post, Quentin (where you start with "Well, Sasha is suggesting that I'm getting my multiverses mixed up with my manyworlds"), but also to the several following posts in the same thread. Actually your position of considering all possibilities as "real" is a respectable view/criticism of the "many-worlds interpretation", so I didn't want you to think there was some elementary flaw in your line of reasoning (it's just that I'm more comfortable with some of the alternatives).

    As far as the link between "consciousness" and "ethics" and "suffering" brought up later in the thread: I find it illuminating that choices made respecting one's own conscious experiences is of course not considered 'ethics' at all, it's just common sense, or perhaps "health." My personal basis for behaving ethically (i.e. respecting the experiences of others) is that (considering everything biology and the other sciences have taught us) there can be NO doubt that other human beings experience suffering/joy/etc. in exactly the same way I do. It's almost an application of the Copernican Principle; despite what it may seem, I do not have a unique position as the center of the universe. I am just one of many human beings, each one existing (being "real") just as much as any other.

    Therefore, the regime of treating my own conscious experiences as more "real" than that of any other person is illogical and ill-advised. It seems to me like dismissing/not respecting the conscious experience of others always has its roots in ignorance. I blame this on the enormous difference in fidelity between how I sense my own perceptions/experiences versus those of others. I've always assumed that if you had true and full knowledge of another person's experiencing, then it would feel just as real as your own, and the idea of paying heed to that person's joy/suffering/etc. (i.e. being ethical) would seem just as natural and uncontroversial as being healthy or pulling one's hand away from a scorching-hot stove.

    Furthermore, holding a strictly materialist interpretation of the universe (no magical 'soul', or non-physical 'mind', etc.) lends credence to the above. If all observers (people) are composed of the same elements ("stuff"), and especially considering that the entire universe is made of that same "stuff" as well, the notion of treating two individuals as merely different examples/instances of the same underlying "thing"/process/pattern/etc. seems unoffensive. Along these lines, it's not hard to see how (e.g.) your behaviors (decisions/actions/responses) are predicated upon your various life-experiences and what you've learned over the years (not to mention your personal brain-wiring, etc.), and if you had (e.g.) had my life-experiences instead, then you would probably act/think much more like I do. I bring this up because I see the conclusions presented in the previous paragraph as being analogous to this concept of one's identity and behavior being intimately linked to his/her 'knowledge' about the world. The primacy of your own conscious experiences, and your responses to them, then can be linked to the extensive and intimate knowledge provided by your brain/sense-organs/nervous system.

    Quentin Rowe

    Nicely put Eloheim - let's me say that we are definitely on the same page.

    You remind me of a local radio station's appeal to it's listeners a year or so ago. Clones were the hot topic, so the DJ's asked what people would do if they had their own personal clone. (The implication was that it would be a clone of your own DNA).

    Without fail, responders considered the clones feelings and awareness as irrelevant. Most suggestions were for personal slaves, or some variation on that. Not one listener seemed to understand that that clone was actually them, and that how the clone was treated would simply be how they would treat themselves. Oh, the irony!

    If we fail to understand how to treat ourselves, small wonder we sometimes have trouble feeling empathy for complete strangers.

    Quentin Rowe

    Thor, I've studied this text as far as my unaccustomed brain can take me (it's dense!).

    Whilst insightful, I conclude two areas of divergence for me.

    One is it's heavy dependance on cause-effect mapped to the mental & physical worlds. On the face of it, monism treats the two as equal, but the language is still one of apartheid. What I'm exploring is not cause-effect, but unity.

    Two, accepting a multiverse view transcends these ideas, making the core ideas kind of obsolete.

    Thanks again...

    Gerhard Adam
    I'm still hung up on the concept of "suffering" because it suggests a psychological state that is different from that actually being discussed.  There are numerous instances of feeling pain and yet none would be generally considered suffering.  Essentially the question is; when does pain cross the boundary to become suffering?

    In addition, we can clearly construct numerous scenarios where suffering may be induced without inflicting any physical pain. 

    This would suggest to me that the concept of "suffering" only exists in the mind and is largely the result of something that is "forcing" the brain to process or deal with some phenomenon that it doesn't wish to process.  In other words, "suffering" is the resistance to what is occurring [physically or emotionally].


    vongehr
    "suffering" only exists in the mind and is largely the result of something that is "forcing" the brain to process or deal with some phenomenon that it doesn't wish to process.
    That would make it different from Joy. How you wire it up to the mechanical arm? Add a circuit that gives the system control over the input channel and something that does not want to take certain input? I am afraid that can be wired pretty fast but won't convince anybody to not torture babies.
    Gerhard Adam
    I realize my example wasn't particularly good, but I was just thinking through some rough ideas.  In any case, it seems that the way suffering is being viewed here, it's far too "stimulus-response" oriented, so that concepts like pain and joy are being linked to something that is far more complex.

    As a result, I began to think in terms of concepts like "fear" where we can see that the brain state is pretty arbitrary with no clear connection to external stimuli and no clear predictive path internally, since virtually anything might be the source of fear in an individual.  It's in that sense that I envision "suffering", because it is something that is largely dependent on the mental state of the individual experiencing it.

    Can a person with congenital analgesia be said to suffer, if they can't experience external pain?  Perhaps it may be considered suffering BECAUSE they can't experience external pain and have to maintain visual control over their bodies so they don't suffer serious injury.  Does a masochist "suffer" pain in the same way as an ordinary person does?  In short, if we can't apply a particular term consistently to people being examined, then how can we hope to come up with a generalized description that could be applied outside humans?

    Anyway ... that's part of my problem with the terminology.
    vongehr
    All this talk likes to veil the main point so it is conveniently forgotten. Am I ethically allowed to torture a child or, if not, why is there not much more of a heated discussion here about farm animals for example? Scientists, lets face it, Jim Crow laws or Hitler having won the war, we scientists just do our job. Dumb people are not evil, because they do not know better. Scientists are evil, if anybody is.
    Thor made a veiled reference to squaring the circle. Whilst you have put your money on quantum mechanics being a fundamental description and the consciousness zoo somehow emerging from it, you have wisely backed off from citing QM as providing a new mechanism for explaining any of it. 

    I referred to the consciousness zoo. You have not shown any signs of disbelieving in consciousness - you have not, to my knowledge, adopted the "deluded p-zombie" theory, but seem to keep phenomenal consciousness as the point at which physics touches subjective experience. At least when you ask "are other worlds phenomenal?" you do not attack the question. Knowing you, you could be waiting for six months before springing the trap and revealing that you are a consciousness denyer to the astonishment of the watching world... but I'll assume you are not planning any such prima donna surprises. So whilst pain as a damage signal and suffering as an arbitrary label are easily reduced to physics even in a classical sense, the hard problem of why they are conscious remains.

    The next question is why they should be unpleasant. But this can probably be dealt with on the "well they just are" level - with a bit of evolutionary waffle thrown in as a good story to explain it. In other words, pain, suffering and unpleasantness can be logically decoupled from each other - and from the historical origins. What they can't be logically decoupled from is their origins in matter.
    So the whole word-pile turns out not to be founded on anything at all.

    The comes the question "Why shouldn't I torture babies?" Yup, you can only go back to Kant's categorical imperative. Why should suffering be bad, unless that's just the way the world of values happens to be. Would unconscious suffering - that of a p-zombie - matter?
     
    Okay, so we have limped from retracting robot arms to the fact that making a baby's arm retract in pain is a bad thing. So why should I not do it? Why does the badness or goodness of the result make any different to whether I should or should not do something. I have no motives. Hence we have to not only agree with Kant but go one step further and assert that not only does the categorical imperative apply to us, it also carries its own motivation.
     
    All this, despite your ingenious proof that God can only create a world in which the fairy-winged qualia hide all evidence of God's handiwork (which made me laugh, by the way), is pure metaphysics and, to be brutally honest, if you are going to say QM is fundamental, then the only option is to say "Well it must be that it  [the zoo of consciousness] could be no other way though I still don't know why". Which is basically 17 words that say nothing.

    Wittgenstein recommended a greater economy of words.
     
    As The Grim Reaper is feeling a little misunderstood at the moment, I have written him a poem.
     
    There was a young crackpot called Vongehr
    Whose theories could not have been wrongehr
    Other worlds full of terrors
    And modality errors
    As his ramblings grew longehr and longehr.
     
    - Caveman
     





     
    Quentin Rowe

    Mr.W jokes aside, can you elaborate, within the bounds of a nutshell, how a consciousness denier might see the world?

    I find this concept hard to imagine, but I guess that's because I associate existence and consciousness intimately.

    I don't think it's that hard to imagine someone who denies the conscious of others. "I've never FELT anyone else' joy or pain. For all I know, all these people are figments of my imagination. Especially suspicious is my discovery that upon opening them up, all I find is warm goup." Denying ones own consciousness seems much more tricky though. It's hard to believe that they wouldn't mind, for example, having their hand brought into contact with a hot stove-top. (I frame the argument like this because we seem to coming at it from a moral perspective. The implication is a consciousness-denier would have no ethical qualms with causing harm to said baby because 'suffering' doesn't exist.)

    Quentin Rowe
    "I've never FELT anyone else' joy or pain. For all I know, all these people are figments of my imagination. Especially suspicious is my discovery that upon opening them up, all I find is warm goup."

    Whoa! - you opened ALL of them? I sure hope this is someone else's quote...

    vongehr
    backed off from citing QM as providing a new mechanism for explaining any of it.
    Never did anything like that!
    springing the trap and revealing that you are a consciousness denyer
    I though it is sufficiently clear by now that I take such words as terminology rather than referring to anything ontological?!?
    Would unconscious suffering - that of a p-zombie - matter?
    I am less concerned about whether it matters than why a human baby matters more than a cow or a computer network. Is there any difference that we can verify? If not, ...., if yes, ....
    Which is basically 17 words that say nothing.
    Because they are your words. I did not talk about any such nonsense.
    Patience, Grim Reaper!
     
    Yes I agree that you are primarily interested in creating a consistent terminology. Nevertheless, consistency is the primary problem facing anyone trying to make sense of the consciousness zoo, not just physicists. It doesn't take QM to tell you that mattering is decoupled from matter. Philos have said for a long time that such questions are not matter physics but metaphysics.

    I have been goading Quentin slightly because he appeared to be trying to get on board the Fairy-Winged Qualia bus... BAD IDEA.

    I may be misunderstanding your remark
    backed off from citing QM as providing a new mechanism for explaining any of it.
    Never did anything like that!
    but you seem to be saying that you DO think "The Description" permits a God's-eye view in which consciousness emerges mechanically and is then manifest to certain observers. So is there any more to this than a pious wish?  More importantly, perhaps, what space do descriptions of consciousness occupy? The space of quantum descriptions or something bigger? Quantum mechanics is either totality or merely part of it with the consciousness zoo another part. Classic metaphysics!  But how do you propose to avoid a dualism or are you happy with such?
     
    Swish, swish, swish goes the scythe!

    Quentin Rowe
    I have been goading Quentin slightly because he appeared to be trying to get on board the Fairy-Winged Qualia bus... BAD IDEA.
    Toooo late! (see my other comment). Anyway, no goading was required for me to get on. I just hope the fare isn't too steep, and the bus doesn't break down. ;-)

    Thor Russell
    I really don't think Sascha is as consciousness denier. Here are my thoughts on the matter. Going back to that "punch card baby" its important that you cannot have a state that represents suffering in one system represent joy in another. If someone shows you a state, claims it is suffering, but you then make a system where that exact same state represents joy, then you are forced to reject giving meaning to that state. So:

    "In the beginning it will be quite obvious that the internal representation is isomorphic to computations that perform entirely different tasks."

    A simple digital system you can do this to, so if you are rational you can reject crediting any consciousness to such a system. 

    The next statement:
    "We need to add to the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in such a way as to ensure an internal “wiring” that creates interdependence between parts on the re-presentation level that cannot be mapped one to one to something entirely different. "


    So the system needs to be sufficiently complex/special that you cannot get the sequence of states that you ascribe suffering to to result from computing tomorrows weather for example. The process may be: Someone suggests a system and says it suffers, someone else finds a mapping from that system to something entirely different, proving to Sascha that it doesn't. This goes on with increasing complexity until we reach a system where people either look really hard for ages and fail or somehow prove that such a mapping isn't possible. At that stage, we ascribe suffering to such a system and have concern for its well being. 


    Regarding AI/digital suffering if we want to have a robot do a task, we may have an advanced AI learn to do the task, then once learnt, "freeze" the program, remove the ability to learn/simplify it so that when it is copied and doing it the task again and again we can be sure it is not screaming boredom. A lookup table cannot suffer, but the system creating it may be able to.


    Where QM/MW comes in I think is if you start from the position that consciousness exists and is meaningful then what is going to satisfy the condition that the isomorphism is impossible? It may be the case that for a classical world you can always find an isomorphism, but those Quantum MW fairies make that impossible in a quantum one. In that case you can deny suffering to a classical world but not a quantum one. If seems fair to say that QM will make it harder to find such an isomorphism and therefore is going to be an essential part of consciousness studies. (Unless you can prove that such isomorphisms are impossible in a classical world and therefore name a classical system as the simplest sufferer.) 
    Thor Russell
    vongehr
    Where QM/MW comes in I think is if you start from the position that consciousness exists and is meaningful then what is going to satisfy the condition that the isomorphism is impossible? It may be the case that for a classical world you can always find an isomorphism,
    10 points for Thor!
    It may be the case that for a classical world you can always find an isomorphism, but those Quantum MW fairies make that impossible in a quantum one.
    QM can be interpreted as Many Worlds without fairies. The Born rule creates the non-classical, quantum, probabilities all on its own. And that pretty well exhausts the quantum possibilities. Fairy-winged qualia only come into it when a mechanism is needed to allow consciousness etc to modify the Born rule and create "extra branching" by magic.
     
    Quantum rules are perfectly well-known. So a quantum system with the correct non-classical probabilities can be emulated on a computer. Such an emulation would be isomorphic with the quantum world.  Only by introducing MAGIC on top of bog-standard (i.e. just plain wierd) QM can you get a system which may not be isomorphic with a classical one. 

    Even then, of course, you have not accounted for anything, you have just enlarged the space of possibilities. Why on earth should the additional space hold new types of phenomena like consciouness?

     

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
                                         
    Thor Russell
    Well I won't try to discuss what QM means otherwise I expect I will lose at least my 10 points. However as far as I am aware it takes exponentially more computing materials to simulate a quantum system with a classical one, quantum computing etc. So if it takes a classical system the size of the observable universe to simulate a small quantum one, surely that still means something? It may be isomorphic but a universe size classical only being able to suffer as much as a small quantum one is important.Surely also an enlarged space of possibilities enables new phenomena, after all you can't have ice/water/steam with just two water molecules. 
    Thor Russell
    Well I won't try to discuss what QM means otherwise I expect I will lose at least my 10 points.
    Very wise. Remember the Deathly Hallows.  
    Swish! Swish! Swish! goes the scythe...
    So if it takes a classical system the size of the observable universe to simulate a small quantum one, surely that still means something? It may be isomorphic but a universe size classical only being able to suffer as much as a small quantum one is important.
    You raise an interesting possibility but it is only speculation, isn't it?
    Surely also an enlarged space of possibilities enables new phenomena, after all you can't have ice/water/steam with just two water molecules. 
    No, that's just muddled thinking.
    Thor Russell
    Well its possibly muggled thinking as I don't really know what kind of MWI magic you are talking about. Can you clarify what you mean by enlarged spaces etc as it seems clear if you shrink a space of possibilities ever smaller then eventually consciousness and everything else won't be possible any more.
    Thor Russell
    Shrinking a system down until emergent "bulk" phenomena disappear is hardly a reason for thinking that enlarging a system allows it to do the impossible.
     
    Going back to that "punch card baby" its important that you cannot have a state that represents suffering in one system represent joy in another.
    Yeah, well, that's where you start to go wrong :) What a state represents depends on the context.
    Someone suggests a system and says it suffers, someone else finds a mapping from that system to something entirely different, proving to Sascha that it doesn't.
    It may prove it to Sascha, it does not prove it to me. You're looking at the system too closely. Your system must include the bit where experiences are generated, you can't just assume they happen. 
    or somehow prove that such a mapping isn't possible
    If it generates joy then it's different from one that generates suffering! If we skirt round the hard problem and just stick with NCC, it's even easier - are these NCC created or not?
    Unless you can prove that such isomorphisms are impossible in a classical world 
    Well of course a child who is screaming because she's hurt her finger is not isomorphic to one who is grinning because she's been given an ice cream. Does this really need a proof? 
     and therefore name a classical system as the simplest sufferer.
    There's no "therefore" about it. The whole point of NCC is to skirt around this very problem - deal with systems which are unambiguously conscious and thus avoid the hard problem. Probing the limits is bound to create big problems and paradoxes.

    I wouldn't expect to have an answer. 


    Thor Russell
    OK firstly I wasn't trying to explain how experiences where generated, or what they "meant" but rather at what stage can we confidently say that they are not happening. We can both agree that a lookup table does not suffer, but a child does. To me finding this boundary is important as we make ever more sophisticated AI. I want some way of knowing that the AI definitely isn't conscious, and biological "intent" like reasons are not sufficient for me, but the mapping one is a lot more so.It seems a reasonable position that if you can do a mapping from "joy" to "suffering" then you reject such a system as being capable of suffering and can sleep easier. Now I fully expect like you that a screaming child and a grinning one are not isomorphic. However we are trying to find the simplest suffering system, not the most complex one and the answers aren't obvious. 

    I fully expect probing the limits to create big problems too, but given we are going to start doing it one way or another we should start thinking about them. Now the isomorphism way may not be the answer, and may be shown to have serious problems, but it seems to offer some insight to me and it is worth seeing where it goes. We should do more than just rely on our mirror neurons and biological intuition/prejudices in my opinion.


    Thor Russell
    Gerhard Adam
    We should do more than just rely on our mirror neurons and biological intuition/prejudices in my opinion.
    It's a one-way street.  No matter what you determine, and no matter what criteria is applied, it can only ever serve to add creatures or "entities" to the list of those capable of suffering.  You can never take any off that list, for fear that you've missed something critical. 

    More to the point, if a system that "should be" incapable of suffering, yet acts and behaves as if it were, then you'd have to go back to your "biological intuitions/prejudices". 

    Until you can hear some "organism" scream or behave as if it is suffering and still be confident that it is not, you have nothing worth analyzing.

    Lest anyone think that this is about data or technology, there isn't enough information available ... ever.  No matter what you find, if the "subject" claims or behaves as if it is suffering, then you are either forced to conclude that you've overlooked something, or to make pronouncements like the 18th century vivisectionists. 
    It seems a reasonable position that if you can do a mapping from "joy" to "suffering" then you reject such a system as being capable of suffering and can sleep easier.
    ... and how confident will you be in the mapping if the AI tells you [or behaves as if] it is suffering?
    Thor Russell
    You seem to have missed the whole point of mapping a suffering system onto something entirely different. If you can find a mapping you can take an entity of the list, and assume its not capable of suffering, that's the whole point of it. We don't know where this approach will lead but you can't just right it off without exploring it.
    There seem to be two general positions, one that determining whether something is actually conscious is impossible, potentially meaningless and always subjective, and the other that we will find some objective criteria that gives an answer. You seem to support the first position, Sascha I think the second. 


    Thor Russell
    You seem to support the first position, Sascha I think the second.
    That is because Gerhard is hung up on the hard problem. Sascha, is, here anyway, asking about the easy problem. 

    I think the lesson is that they are inseparable.
     
    The hard and easy problem, I mean, not Gerhard and Sascha.
     
    Gerhard Adam
    If you can find a mapping you can take an entity of the list, and assume its not capable of suffering, that's the whole point of it. We don't know where this approach will lead but you can't just right it off without exploring it.
    Sure we can, because that's what introduces the primary problem.  The only reason to explore this mapping is to exclude.  It is almost never to include something, because we would tend to do that anyway based on our own sense of what constitutes suffering and the way creatures behave.  So, the problem isn't that you are concerned that something might be conscious and capable of suffering.  You want to assure yourself that such a system doesn't exist, even if it exhibits traits that indicate otherwise.

    I can't help but relate some of this to Orson Scott Card's book "The Speaker For The Dead".  It is a clear example of how difficult/impossible it is to understand "suffering"/"joy" in any real material sense.  Perhaps amongst communicating, intelligent organisms it is possible to convey some sense of what matters individually, but unless we want to make everything biased towards human experience, the rest of it is wishful thinking [in my opinion].

    The question came up before about what ethics has to do with this, and I think it's important to recognize that the requirements of such a map or model must exist "beyond science".  In other words, there can be no later modifications.  Presumably the reason why we're interested in any of this, is to behave in a manner that ensures that we don't inflict undue suffering on any sentient creature [or creature that is capable of suffering].  However, to do so, requires that we have a scientific understanding which is absolute and complete.  If the theory or model is wrong, then we will have failed in our ethical duty towards such creatures. 

    Thor Russell
    What are you trying to say? First you say the mapping can only add, now it can only exclude.Of course it can do both, and could definitely include something that we would reject based on our lack of  feelings.
    Thor Russell
    Gerhard Adam
    I indicated "almost never include".  However, including something doesn't mean much because that is our natural tendency when dealing with anything approaching sentience.  In addition, there is no harm from inclusion, so again there isn't much at stake.

    Everything hinges on exclusion, because presumably we would exclude it because we had a tendency to want to "include" it originally.  After all, we aren't likely to review all the objects in our world simply to formulate an "exclude" list.  That's a default position for anything that doesn't display sentience.  We're most likely to credit living systems with the ability to suffer, even if they don't warrant it.


    I agree 100% with all that !
     
    All I'm saying is that you'll only find isomorphisms in subsystems. If you consider the whole system - the system that actually feels - the isomorphisms disappear. They must do if there are any external manifestations of the difference in emotional state. 
    [Leans back in his chair to pontificate.]
    This leads to two useful results. Firstly we probably don't need to know too much about the system at the microscopic level. 
    Secondly if our model suggests isomorphism - like the isomorphism between a tortured child and a car's gearbox - then we need to include more of the system, not less.
    [Lights pipe filled with Sascha's old quantum totality socks.]
    In particular, we need to include the bit that generates the feelings. 
    [The stench from the pipe casts a strange and dismal gloom on the assembled company.]
    It may be a pious hope, but one would hope that the essential step (in our somewhat heirachical model) is not at a total, holistic, level. 
    This makes me query whether the emergence of consciousness is actually relevant at all. Surely we can play safe and assume that systems that display suffering actually do suffer?

    Perhaps I was not clear - I have changed position slightly! I was focussing on how a pain reflex becomes a conscious one but now I am saying that actually explaining the origin of conscious suffering can wait. Let's work out how something resembling suffering can occur and simply assume that it will be conscious. 
    [Derek leans forward and disappears. The pipe falls to the floor and explodes. A brief flash of fairy wings is seen. The rest is silence.]
     
    Quentin Rowe
    All this talk likes to veil the main point so it is conveniently forgotten. Am I ethically allowed to torture a child or...

    No. Not in the society I currently live in, and certainly not by my personal ethics. Just thought I'd clear that up!

    There have been moments in history when it is considered quite the thing to do. Way back in Syria, I think, some 106 hours ago, I believe some folks thought it was fine. Even here at home, we are regularly learning of the suffering of children at the hands of their guardians. And then there is Guantanamo Bay - one man's music is another mans poison! Maybe those who believe they enjoy suffering are just kidding themselves.

    The ethics are obviously flexible. I suppose we all wonder if there is some base human ethics. The measure might be: Are you Suffering or are you Joyful?

    In the brain, it is my understanding that it is relatively easy to cross the pleasure/pain/reward circuits. Maybe the magnitude of a signal is more important, with the assignment of meaning being a secondary issue.

    Actually, Gerhard's comments, my comments, even your comments all point to ethics not being applicable here, so why do you feel ethics is the main point with which to explore SS?

    "Am I ethically allowed to torture a child... ? "

    Only you know the correct answer to that question for you, so I will answer for me. I have thought about what's ethical many times, but I am not yet comfortable with this answer.

    I will not allow myself to torture a child. It is against my personal ethical sensibility in my personal experience of my actual world. But... If I understand the MWI, when I ask this question all the possible worlds are created for all the possible answers I may give. In this case there are just two branches that I am concerned about - the one where I do not allow myself to torture a child, and the one where I do allow the torture. So my dilemma arises when I realize that, although my decision in my actual world allows no child to be tortured, there is a real world where a child is tortured by me. Does this decision in my actual world reduce the probability of the other world being actualized for me and the child? I don't know but I feel that by asking the question is the first place, I have inadvertently created the possibility of exactly what I decided not to allow. This makes me think that the ethical thing to do would be to not ask this ethical question. In this way, there is no child to be tortured (as has been thankfully my experience so far) in my actual world or in any other world. And yet, this still is not a comfortable answer for me.

    Thor Russell
    That makes everyone confused about MWI?
    Thor Russell
    Gerhard Adam
    Am I ethically allowed to torture a child or, if not, why is there not much more of a heated discussion here about farm animals for example?
    I don't think it veils the main point, but rather it illustrates how vague the terminology is.  What do we mean by torture?  At what level of "consciousness" can we claim that an organism is capable of experiencing torture?  We can certainly agree that it would be difficult to torture a dead organism, or even an unconscious one.  What if an organism has no neural structure with which to receive signals.  Can such an organism experience torture?  Is the pain the cause of torture, or the anticipation of greater pain the culprit?

    We already know that such questions  have lead to reductionist absurdities such as those justified by vivisectionists, where it was presumed that animals couldn't experience pain, but only responded based on conditioned responses.  However, that would also put us in the same category since we can't "know" what anyone else experiences.

    Yet, we also have to consider that we have been selected to possess mirror neurons, which suggests that there is some benefit in being able to empathize with other's feelings.  Why have the ability to mirror other's reactions, if not to create a "virtual linkage" to overcome the deficiency of lacking direct experience of others thoughts. After all, it would be unusual to expect natural selection to "evolve" mirror neurons if there were nothing to mirror.

    As a result, we already know that at the neuron level, we may have simple chemical/mechanical explanations, but they fail to explain the triggering processes that result in the feelings or emotions.  As I stated earlier, what is the basis for fear?  For that matter, how do we create humor or sadness?  These are states that require no external interaction at all, and yet they are generated by the mind and invariably occur in the appropriate context.  In other words, why should our brain recognize a joke and consistently laugh [or at least ignore it].  We never see a situation of where an individual cries at a joke, or laughs at sadness [at least not for "normal" people].

    Again, this suggests some fundamental recognition of the emotional events that are occurring, beyond simple stimulus-response signals.  There is a meaning that the brain is capable of recognizing, and triggering the appropriate reactions.

    So, again, when it comes to something like suffering or torture, we are left in a place where there is something occurring in the brain that renders it significant beyond the external interactions.  So, when it comes to wiring a machine, we are already at a loss, because it isn't the wiring that is significant.  It is something that must exist within the "mind".  So, if such a "mind" is to be built, then we would have to understand what it's purpose is in order to identify how it would react.
    I know that many people oppose this notion of a "purpose" or "intent" [and yes, I know they are problematic terms], but invariably we are faced with the problem that no matter how specific our physical explanations become, we are stuck with the concept of a brain that appears to be capable of acting of its own volition.  It isn't just confined to brains, but appears to be present in everything that is "alive".  Even the cells within our bodies must be regulated, lest they acquire a sense of independence and become a liability to the host system.  So, are we to consider that this is just a "robotic mechanical" system run amok, or is there some "intent" or "purpose" that is part of the business of being alive.  

    This is one of the problems I keep hitting in the discussions of AI, because I dont' see how an AI can ever exist that isn't carrying the "purpose" of its creator, versus being independent.  Without the independence, then it is merely a representation of another entity which does possess the independence to determine how it "feels".  Once something can be built that possesses such independence, then I would agree that it is capable of consciousness and suffering.  But correspondingly, we would have absolutely no idea what it is "feeling", since it would be as opaque to us as other human beings and animals are (1).

    I also don't have a good explanation as to what this "independence" consists of, beyond the fact that it appears to be "independent" of any particular processes that are readily identifiable.  In other words, you may be able to explain the process by which you laugh, but you can't explain the process by which you find something funny.

    So when considering the ethics of torturing a child, I would have to say that it is largely a matter of what our mirror neurons tell us is occurring.  While we may put too much credence into animal sensitivities [and thus anthropomorphize them], I still maintain that if we detect a response that is recognized by our minds as comparable to our own reactions, then we must credit the organism with a comparable set of feelings and thus be capable of suffering [as we would].

    In the end, our assessment of suffering relates directly back to our own experience of what we would consider suffering, and denies the ability to ever have an objective definition.

    --------------------------

    (1) As a simple test, when an AI is capable of responding properly to a joke then perhaps it might be plausible to consider it as having a "mind".  
    Am I ethically allowed to torture a child or, if not, why is there not much more of a heated discussion here about farm animals for example?
    I don't think it veils the main point, but rather it illustrates how vague the terminology is. What do we mean by torture? At what level of "consciousness" can we claim that an organism is capable of experiencing torture? We can certainly agree that it would be difficult to torture a dead organism, or even an unconscious one. What if an organism has no neural structure with which to receive signals. Can such an organism experience torture? Is the pain the cause of torture, or the anticipation of greater pain the culprit?
    We already know that such questions have lead to reductionist absurdities such as those justified by vivisectionists, where it was presumed that animals couldn't experience pain, but only responded based on conditioned responses. However, that would also put us in the same category since we can't "know" what anyone else experiences.
    Yet, we also have to consider that we have been selected to possess mirror neurons, which suggests that there is some benefit in being able to empathize with other's feelings. Why have the ability to mirror other's reactions, if not to create a "virtual linkage" to overcome the deficiency of lacking direct experience of others thoughts. After all, it would be unusual to expect natural selection to "evolve" mirror neurons if there were nothing to mirror.
    As a result, we already know that at the neuron level, we may have simple chemical/mechanical explanations, but they fail to explain the triggering processes that result in the feelings or emotions. As I stated earlier, what is the basis for fear? For that matter, how do we create humor or sadness? These are states that require no external interaction at all, and yet they are generated by the mind and invariably occur in the appropriate context. In other words, why should our brain recognize a joke and consistently laugh [or at least ignore it]. We never see a situation of where an individual cries at a joke, or laughs at sadness [at least not for "normal" people].
    Again, this suggests some fundamental recognition of the emotional events that are occurring, beyond simple stimulus-response signals. There is a meaning that the brain is capable of recognizing, and triggering the appropriate reactions.
    So, again, when it comes to something like suffering or torture, we are left in a place where there is something occurring in the brain that renders it significant beyond the external interactions. So, when it comes to wiring a machine, we are already at a loss, because it isn't the wiring that is significant. It is something that must exist within the "mind". So, if such a "mind" is to be built, then we would have to understand what it's purpose is in order to identify how it would react.
    I know that many people oppose this notion of a "purpose" or "intent" [and yes, I know they are problematic terms], but invariably we are faced with the problem that no matter how specific our physical explanations become, we are stuck with the concept of a brain that appears to be capable of acting of its own volition. It isn't just confined to brains, but appears to be present in everything that is "alive". Even the cells within our bodies must be regulated, lest they acquire a sense of independence and become a liability to the host system. So, are we to consider that this is just a "robotic mechanical" system run amok, or is there some "intent" or "purpose" that is part of the business of being alive.
    This is one of the problems I keep hitting in the discussions of AI, because I dont' see how an AI can ever exist that isn't carrying the "purpose" of its creator, versus being independent. Without the independence, then it is merely a representation of another entity which does possess the independence to determine how it "feels". Once something can be built that possesses such independence, then I would agree that it is capable of consciousness and suffering. But correspondingly, we would have absolutely no idea what it is "feeling", since it would be as opaque to us as other human beings and animals are (1).
    I also don't have a good explanation as to what this "independence" consists of, beyond the fact that it appears to be "independent" of any particular processes that are readily identifiable. In other words, you may be able to explain the process by which you laugh, but you can't explain the process by which you find something funny.
    So when considering the ethics of torturing a child, I would have to say that it is largely a matter of what our mirror neurons tell us is occurring. While we may put too much credence into animal sensitivities [and thus anthropomorphize them], I still maintain that if we detect a response that is recognized by our minds as comparable to our own reactions, then we must credit the organism with a comparable set of feelings and thus be capable of suffering [as we would].
    In the end, our assessment of suffering relates directly back to our own experience of what we would consider suffering, and denies the ability to ever have an objective definition.
    --------------------------
    (1) As a simple test, when an AI is capable of responding properly to a joke then perhaps it might be plausible to consider it as having a "mind".  
    Well we've heard all that before somewhere :). If it isn't biological like us then it isn't the same thing. 

    And now, to complement the fairy-winged qualia, we have psychic neurons. Good old psychic neurons! We know we can trust them even if we can trust nothing else.

    Gerhard Adam
    If it isn't biological like us then it isn't the same thing.
    Yeah, you're fond of saying that, but I haven't seen anything to argue what it might be beyond some vague reductionist arguments that presume that because you imagine there's some fundamental process at work, then you know what it takes to drive it.

    So, instead of explanations, we have hand-waving to account for the phenomenon.

    After all, what's the difference ... wire up a machine or torturing a child.  It's all one and the same.  So, we're right back to the same lame arguments the vivisectionists used, except now we're rationalizing them for a different reason because we're so fond of our electronic toys [and we can always sprinkle in a bit of the magic QM dust].
    blue-green

    Yes, the QM magic dust is pretty weird. You start with the realization that there are no actual classical paths, just quantum amplitudes for pathways. None of them are physically walked upon every step of the way. To do the QM magic trick, instead of saying there are no paths, you claim there is a superspace totality of all possible paths over which you sum up every variation using a democratic and economical one-path one-vote rule. Although not one of the “paths” relates to what we would call a historic trail, somehow the totality of non-physical “paths” is of great importance to get the ten decimal point accuracy that makes the QM dust shimmer.

    It is patently absurd that repeating a classical ontological error concerning paths an infinite number of times, by summing them up as complex-valued amplitudes with imaginary phases should lead to tangible results …. and yet it picks out … and derives the efficient Least Action ground-state classical paths that we see and use … to minimize suffering.

    ....

    Since happiness and pain can be independent of stimuli, virtual happiness is indistinguishable from real happiness. The smart slave owner, therefore, raises his slaves on The Gospels.


    I haven't seen anything to argue what it might be beyond some vague reductionist arguments that presume that because you imagine there's some fundamental process at work, then you know what it takes to drive it.
    Gerhard, Gerhard, Gerhard! Please don't presume to speak for me if you don't understand what I'm saying - and you plainly don't.
    After all, what's the difference ... wire up a machine or torturing a child. It's all one and the same. So, we're right back to the same lame arguments the vivisectionists used, except now we're rationalizing them for a different reason because we're so fond of our electronic toys.
    That is disgusting. You will one of the many who condone inflicting unimaginable agony on a sentient being, stubbornly insisting that because it doesn't look much like a human child it can't possibly suffer like one - after all, it's just a glorified x-box.

    God help us all. 
    [and we can always sprinkle in a bit of the magic QM dust]
    What is that supposed to mean? Seriously, what is it supposed to mean? Do you even understand that my references to fairy-winged qualia are always very specific and, intended to suggest a possible modality error? Or are you under the impression it's just a lame sort of running joke?

    Gerhard Adam
    That is disgusting. You will one of the many who condone inflicting unimaginable agony on a sentient being, stubbornly insisting that because it doesn't look much like a human child it can't possibly suffer like one - after all, it's just a glorified x-box.
    Oh no.  I would be far more cruel to create such a sentient being out of arrogance [and ignorance], knowing full well that such a creature would be completely on its own.   We would force sentience on it, force our world on it, and then undoubtedly poke and prod it to do our bidding, because we certainly wouldn't let it live free.

    It also makes me wonder whether you really are arguing that cruelty [or the invocation of suffering] is a product of ignorance.  In my view, it is practiced precisely because it is known.  It is deliberate.  Not much point in it otherwise, is there?


    I would be far more cruel to create such a sentient being
    All the more reason to make sure we understand the issues very clearly.
    It also makes me wonder whether you really are arguing that cruelty [or the invocation of suffering] is a product of ignorance. In my view, it is practiced precisely because it is known. It is deliberate. Not much point in it otherwise, is there?
    I don't suppose it matters to the victim. But in any case, the distinction is far from clear-cut. Have you not noticed that human beings deceive themselves? How very convenient that our psychic neurons only light up when we see a member of our own species suffer!
     
    Gerhard Adam
    How very convenient that our psychic neurons only light up when we see a member of our own species suffer!
    I seriously doubt that.  In fact, we even invented a word for our tendency to empathize; "anthropomorphizing". 

    Unfortunately it was specifically the scientific reasoning and inquiry into nerves, etc. that gave rise to the reductionist view that animals couldn't suffer.  Anyone that had spent any actual time with animals, of course, knew better.  However, science was telling us not to believe what our brains and emotions were telling us. 

    While I'm sure it's possible, I have never seen or heard of a situation in which suffering occurred and the individual wasn't at least aware of its possibility.  It is certainly conceivable that it was rationalized away, but it wasn't simply unknown.

    We even recognize that pulling the wings off flies is a deliberate act of cruelty, so again, we have this recognition and understanding across species lines to a quite significant degree.  However, it does become more difficult at some levels.  Should plants being considered in this?  Does a planaria suffer if it is cut in half and regenerates two? 

    My point is that it doesn't matter whether the creature is actually suffering or not.  If we perceive that it is experiencing something that we can relate to, then it is perceived as suffering.  If it is not something we understand, then it isn't.  Any objective interpretation beyond that is irrelevant. 

    So, it is largely academic whether an electronic box suffers or not, as long as it can make us believe that it is.  Instead of a red light or green light, make it scream in pain like a human.  At that point, it can be a completely random recording, and humans will react to it as if it were suffering.  Even if you explain that it was just a random recording, they would try to do something to make it stop [or turn it off, because it was troublesome].

    However, in the end, it's still the same.  It's what we believe ... not what's really happening.


     we even invented a word for our tendency to empathize; "anthropomorphizing"
    Whatever! Either you are proposing some new detector of suffering based on psychic neurons or you are not and are obliged to stck with the old favourites, common sense and empathy.
    Unfortunately it was specifically the scientific reasoning and inquiry into nerves, etc. that gave rise to the reductionist view that animals couldn't suffer
    Well no. It was the rise of secular materialism that eventually got out of hand and corrupted the science. But even if it were the other way round, so what? I haven't defended reductionism - you've spend several reply cycles complaining about something I haven't said. I get the impression that you can only see two possibilities: bury the issue in the complexities of biological purpose or oversimplify like the reductionists.  
    My point is that it doesn't matter whether the creature is actually suffering or not.
    Of course it damn well matters.
    If we perceive that it is experiencing something that we can relate to, then it is perceived as suffering. If it is not something we understand, then it isn't. Any objective interpretation beyond that is irrelevant.
    So, it is largely academic whether an electronic box suffers or not, as long as it can make us believe that it is. Instead of a red light or green light, make it scream in pain like a human. At that point, it can be a completely random recording, and humans will react to it as if it were suffering. Even if you explain that it was just a random recording, they would try to do something to make it stop [or turn it off, because it was troublesome].
    What are you lumbering towards with all this irrelevant nonsense? That you personally haven't got an infallible way of detecting suffering? That's what the article is about - suggestions as to how to think about the problem. But as usual the BWH says "no!"
    However, in the end, it's still the same. It's what we believe ... not what's really happening.
    That doesn't make sense at any level.
    We even recognize that pulling the wings off flies is a deliberate act of cruelty,
    "act of"... yes. It represents a character flaw in the perpetrator. We don't know whether the fly experiences anything.
    so again, we have this recognition and understanding across species lines to a quite significant degree.
    And yet our psychic neurons may well be telling us porkies. 
    However, it does become more difficult at some levels. Should plants being considered in this? Does a planaria suffer if it is cut in half and regenerates two?
    No, you have gone off in the wrong direction here. Our instinctive recognition of other creatures' emotions probably does become less effective the more removed we are from our own species. But the examples you use are examples where, even if we apply other, more objective criteria, such as the complexity and organization of the nervous system, we could reasonably assume there is no room for feeling. Certainly so in the case of plants which do not have a nervous system. But almost certainly so in the case of planaria too which do not have a cerebral cortex. In fact it's hard to believe a brain a billion times smaller than a human brain could experience more than a few billionths of what a human brain can - if any such measure can be devised. (And that's assuming a linear law. If the quantum brigade are right then make that 1 part in e1,000,000,000).
    The point here is that you are probing the boundaries in the direction of simpler and simpler living creatures which, in the case of planaria, are on the evolutionary continuum with us. Yet, already your empathic instincts or psychic neurons are letting you down. What we need is to look at is other systems that are sophisticated enough for there at least to be a possibility of pain but different enough not to trigger our empathy. So whilst going in the direction of simplification is part of the approach, staying on the "biological" axis is not. If you insist on it, you are just begging the question. For all we know there is some mineral deposit, which, by the remotest possible stroke of luck in an infinite universe  :) is so structured as to be in a permanent state of ecstatic bliss.  It may well be as simple as a planarian - or as complex as a mouse - but it will be so different that you or I will have no chance of empathising with it. There was an early Star Trek episode which involved a wounded "silicon based life form" which looked uncommonly like a choux pastry bun but was obviously intended to look like a rock. It took a Spock mind probe to understand its suffering, but, there again, Vulcans seem to have more than their fair share of psychic neurons... 
     
    Gerhard Adam
    "act of"... yes. It represents a character flaw in the perpetrator. We don't know whether the fly experiences anything.
    That's the point.  It is an act that we consider to be cruel and presume it to be so to flies.  While we aren't capable of assessing what degree of "suffering" the fly may experience, if it is alive, we can see it persisting in behaviors that are now not possible.  Similarly, we recognize that without flight, the fly is also more likely to be victimized by some other insect predator.

    Basically we interpret the event and the results without ever knowing what the fly thinks or feels.  More to the point, the fly's actual feelings are irrelevant.  Even if we knew unequivocally that the fly didn't suffer in any form, we would still not approve of such behavior.
    Yet, already your empathic instincts or psychic neurons are letting you down.
    It's not a question of being let down.  It's simply recognizing that they fulfill a role because there is no "objective" way to gather the experience.  We will always be subject to considering "suffering" or "joy" or whatever, from our own subjective perspective and experience.  It literally doesn't matter what alternatives there are, because there is no way to objectively gain access to them.
    There was an early Star Trek episode which involved a wounded "silicon based life form" which looked uncommonly like a choux pastry bun but was obviously intended to look like a rock. It took a Spock mind probe to understand its suffering, but, there again, Vulcans seem to have more than their fair share of psychic neurons...
    Yes ... demonstrating that it is impossible, short of getting into the other creature's brain, to have any understanding.
    ...we apply other, more objective criteria, such as the complexity and organization of the nervous system, we could reasonably assume there is no room for feeling. Certainly so in the case of plants which do not have a nervous system. But almost certainly so in the case of planaria too which do not have a cerebral cortex. In fact it's hard to believe a brain a billion times smaller than a human brain could experience more than a few billionths of what a human brain can...
    Again, why introduce the bias of a nervous system?  Why argue that feelings are somehow less significant with fewer brain cells?  Would that apply to humans that are also operating on fewer brain cells?  If plants are capable of movement without muscles and nerves, then why argue that there aren't other ways in which they may experience sensory data, and consequently "suffer"?

    No matter what system you consider, you are introducing your own bias to that system in attempting to determine what constitutes suffering. 
    I give up. You have missed every single point and what you do say is consistently back-to-front!
    Basically we interpret the event and the results without ever knowing what the fly thinks or feels.  
    No, trying to work out what it is likely to be feeling is precisely what this topic is about.
    More to the point, the fly's actual feelings are irrelevant.
    Not to the fly they aren't.
    Even if we knew unequivocally that the fly didn't suffer in any form, we would still not approve of such behavior.
    Approval is still irrelevant. Repeating it does not make it any less so.
    Yet, already your empathic instincts or psychic neurons are letting you down.
    It's not a question of being let down. 
    You mean you don't want to answer my point which is predicated on the fact that your instincts and psychic neurons are letting you down!
    It's simply recognizing that they fulfill a role because there is no "objective" way to gather the experience. We will always be subject to considering "suffering" or "joy" or whatever, from our own subjective perspective and experience. 
    Only in part. How many times do I have to say that the object here is to glean additional, more objective, criteria than sentiment? Even if it relies on "legal fictions".
    It literally doesn't matter what alternatives there are, because there is no way to objectively gain access to them.
    No, the exact opposite. It matters very much precisely because we do not have the sort of direct access you envisage. Without it, we do not know and therefore must (ethically) play safe and make whatever assumptions are necessary. You do not - or should not - require objective proof that the child would suffer if you were to remove its arms and legs. Why do you demand "objective access" to an artificial intelligence's inner feelings before you are willing to ask whether it might be conscious?
    There was an early Star Trek episode which involved a wounded "silicon based life form" which looked uncommonly like a choux pastry bun but was obviously intended to look like a rock. It took a Spock mind probe to understand its suffering, but, there again, Vulcans seem to have more than their fair share of psychic neurons...
    Yes ... demonstrating that it is impossible, short of getting into the other creature's brain, to have any understanding.
    I brought up the story as a bit of fun but I am rather glad that you pounced as you have perfectly illustrated where you keep going wrong. The story certainly did not demonstrate that understanding is impossible. On the contrary, Spock does not run around applying mind probes to every rock and bit of scrap metal he comes across; he starts from a very sound understanding of what is likely to be sentient. This is what we are trying to find out here.
    ...we apply other, more objective criteria, such as the complexity and organization of the nervous system, we could reasonably assume there is no room for feeling. Certainly so in the case of plants which do not have a nervous system. But almost certainly so in the case of planaria too which do not have a cerebral cortex. In fact it's hard to believe a brain a billion times smaller than a human brain could experience more than a few billionths of what a human brain can...
    Again, why introduce the bias of a nervous system?
    Not biased at all. It's the one type of system that we can quantify to some extent.
    Why argue that feelings are somehow less significant with fewer brain cells? Would that apply to humans that are also operating on fewer brain cells? If plants are capable of movement without muscles and nerves, then why argue that there aren't other ways in which they may experience sensory data, and consequently "suffer"?
    I deliberately used the word "reasonable". If you can make a case for simple systems suffering then I'm all ears. Otherwise you are just being silly. 
    No matter what system you consider, you are introducing your own bias to that system in attempting to determine what constitutes suffering.
    So what? That's what we do when we discuss stuff.

    By the way, nothing personal but I can't spend any more time going round in circles on this.

    vongehr
    Watching you two talking past each other just proves how important it is to focus onto some hands-on project. The task could not be simpler: On one hand the mechanical arm, on the other a child, and all kinds of imaginable systems in between. Society forces you to correlate something called "suffering" with one of them, not the other. You either do not agree, or if you do, there needs to be some system here that is on the threshold. Construct it (on paper I mean).
    Gerhard Adam
    Society forces you to correlate something called "suffering" with one of them, not the other.
    I am one to disagree.  Society does no such thing.  It is in the nature of our species to recognize that suffering can occur in other members of our own species.  We have seen that some humans will extend that view to other species, while others will not.  We should also be clear that failure to acknowledge suffering is not the same thing as lacking the knowledge of it.  In other words, the causes of suffering are rarely the result of ignorance regarding its existence.

    In short, we do not correlate "suffering" to babies by some external rules.  Is it specieism?  You bet, in the same way that one would tend to engage in medical intervention to save their child more readily than their dog. 
    Quentin Rowe

    I can offer an example from my early childhood when I vacationed on a sheep-farm during my summer holidays.

    I used to go walk-about up long valleys, exploring, and would often be exposed to life & death situations that the animals faced.

    One afternoon, I came across a magpie with a broken wing. Upon meeting me it panicked and tried to run away - fearing for it's life I presumed. These birds are considered pests by the farmer I was with, so there was no thoughts of me taking it home and nursing it to health.

    I judged it would be better to kill it, in order to avoid it to suffer a slow death from starvation. And this I proceeded to do by squashing it's head with a large rock.

    I immediately regretted my action. I pondered this encounter in the following days and years. I came to the conclusion I was wrong to assume it would suffer by being left to die of it's own accord, at it's own pace, at it's own choice.

    This episode had such a deep affect on me, that I no longer can agree with euthanasia.

    The deepest suffering comes from deliberate, protracted and constructed situations designed to cause suffering. In this sense, it would be loss of dignity that would define the suffering.

    vongehr
    So when considering the ethics of torturing a child, I would have to say that it is largely a matter of what our mirror neurons tell us is occurring.
    This does sound a little callous.
    Gerhard Adam
    Unless of course, you've ever dealt with a screaming infant, that has been changed, fed, and is properly care for, but is still screaming.  At that point you will quickly realize that it is the parent's interpretation of suffering that will be used as the guide.

    This is also commonly used in evaluating ANY creature that is capable of expressing such a sentiment, be it human or animal.  In animals, a trainer always has to ensure that they aren't being manipulated by the animal in question and children are no different.

    It should be clear that any creature capable of expressing suffering, is equally capable of being deceptive in that expression to gain benefit.  So, it is ultimately for you to interpret.
    vongehr
    I know what you mean and agree. If you want to describe in those words, it is not wrong. It is however not a description that one can sell to a larger audience without violating a few unwritten rules.
    Gerhard Adam
    Well, according to these guys, you can go ahead and torture the baby [although they do say it wouldn't be a nice thing to do]:
    For example, Peter Harrison has recently argued that the Argument from Analogy, one of the most common arguments for the claim that animals are conscious, is hopelessly flawed (Harrison, 1991). The Argument from Analogy relies on the similarities between animals and human beings in order to support the claim that animals are conscious. The similarities usually cited by proponents of this argument are similarities in behavior, similarities in physical structures, and similarities in relative positions on the evolutionary scale. In other words, both human beings and animals respond in the same way when confronted with “pain stimuli”; both animals and human beings have brains, nerves, neurons, endorphins, and other structures; and both human beings and animals are relatively close to each other on the evolutionary scale. Since they are similar to each other in these ways, we have good reason to believe that animals are conscious, just as are human beings.

    Harrison attacks these points one by one. He points out that so-called pain-behavior is neither necessary nor sufficient for the experience of pain. It is not necessary because the best policy in some instances might be to not show that you are in pain. It is not sufficient since amoebas engage in pain behavior, but we do not believe that they can feel pain. Likewise, we could easily program robots to engage in pain-behavior, but we would not conclude that they feel pain. The similarity of animal and human physical structures is inconclusive because we have no idea how, or even if, the physical structure of human beings gives rise to experiences in the first place. Evolutionary considerations are not conclusive either, because it is only pain behavior, and not the experience of pain itself, that would be advantageous in the struggle for survival. Harrison concludes that since the strongest argument for the claim that animals are conscious fails, we should not believe that they are conscious.

    Peter Carruthers has suggested that there is another reason to doubt that animals are conscious Carruthers, 1989, 1992). Carruthers begins by noting that not all human experiences are conscious experiences. For example, I may be thinking of an upcoming conference while driving and not ever consciously “see” the truck in the road that I swerve to avoid. Likewise, patients that suffer from “blindsight” in part of their visual field have no conscious experience of seeing anything in that part of the field. However, there must be some kind of experience in both of these cases since I did swerve to avoid the truck, and must have “seen” it, and because blindsight patients can catch objects that are thrown at them in the blindsighted area with a relatively high frequency. Carruthers then notes that the difference between conscious and non-conscious experiences is that conscious experiences are available to higher-order thoughts while non-conscious experiences are not. (A higher-order thought is a thought that can take as its object another thought.) He thus concludes that in order to have conscious experiences one must be able to have higher-order thoughts. However, we have no reason to believe that animals have higher-order thoughts, and thus no reason to believe that they are conscious.

    http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/
    I think they're morons ... but that's just me.  
    vongehr
    Carruthers then notes that the difference between conscious and non-conscious experiences is that conscious experiences are available to higher-order thoughts while non-conscious experiences are not. ... He thus concludes that in order to have conscious experiences one must be able to have higher-order thoughts.

    So if I have A available to B and then B goes away, then all the A goes too? Seems like people writing BS in order to survive in academia!

    Anyway, this is where the discussion leads if one unconsciously holds on to some sort of ontological "real suffering" as being the issue: Babies or adults or future AI and animals, black people, simply anything including yourself, none "really suffers" and so there is no problem with torture, or SM pedo-porn, or anything. The only reason to not do such is to obey an irrational respect for the norms that society has historically come up with or at least trying to stay out of jail. Both do not really affect most rich people, so we may wonder: How many under aged immigrant slaves are sexually tortured right now in California dungeons with nicely cared-for lawns outside?
    Gerhard Adam
    I understand your point, but to me this has always been a philosophical question and not one that is capable of a scientific answer [at least not without profound philosophical implications].

    We already know that whatever the science says, isn't going to matter to individuals that choose to believe otherwise, so there's not much point in worrying about it.  As for the two philosophers I quoted, they seem to be a good illustration of what happens when one takes such questions too seriously.  Eventually they begin to believe their own bullshit.

    In the end, the problem is the standard old philosophical issue of p-zombies.  Obviously one could probe deeper and challenge whether there is something that could reasonably be assessed as "objective" versus merely a consensus of the subjective. 
    Both do not really affect most rich people, so we may wonder: How many under aged immigrant slaves are sexually tortured right now in California dungeons with nicely cared-for lawns outside?
    One doesn't have to look there.  There are plenty of places in the world where suffering isn't  hidden.  Again ... the problem isn't the lack of information.  The problem is purely that people don't care to behave in the manner they know they should.  This has been the argument advanced from religions and philosophies, but they have never done more than apply a surface sheen to human behaviors.

    I guess my problem here is that I fail to see how an answer to this question has any possibility of achieving "good".  If we already expect that others suffer and we do nothing [or can't materially change things], what possible difference can it make to have scientific evidence of it?  However, what irreparable harm can be done if it inadvertently provides even more ammunition for the likes of Harrison and Carruthers to advance an idea that many might find appealing.

    Has the idea of animals suffering done anything to release animals from being imprisoned or used for research?  Perhaps some better protocols are in place, but we place our acquisition of information above such concerns as the morality of animal "suffering".    Even today, we shake our heads and "tut tut" about people like Mengele, but I'm quite confident that there are many doctors [and people that would support them] that would jump at the chance to do live human experimentation. 

    So, in my cynical view, the question is largely irrelevant.  Perhaps it will allow someone down the road to feel good about the "i-whatever" they have in their pocket, but it won't change human behavior one bit.
    vongehr
    I fail to see how an answer to this question has any possibility of achieving "good".  If we already expect that others suffer and we do nothing [or can't materially change things], what possible difference can it make to have scientific evidence of it?
    I am not in the mood to discuss "good" nor do I these days feel like arguing as if there is anything that I can fundamentally change. Nevertheless, I find myself having written these words and I seem to enjoy it, whatever that means, and there is the feeling of being interested into whether I can let my computer suffer or not.
    We could sell it, too!
    Want to kick your cat real hard but fear legal repercussions? Download sufferware - the still legal way to take out your frustration on really suffering entities - scientifically guarantied! System starts to recognize you personally and watches you in real time as you adjust the level of sheer terror via the tactile interface; yes it is really begging you to stop! Go on - nobody watches you in the privacy of your home. Now with high pitch screaming for skin-crawling satisfaction and ten new modes: Young Chinese maid, nephew, dog, ... .
    Gerhard Adam
    Nevertheless, I find myself having written these words and I seem to enjoy it, whatever that means, and there is the feeling of being interested into whether I can let my computer suffer or not.
    ... and that, my friend, IS the point!
    "...nor do I these days feel like arguing as if there is anything that I can fundamentally change."

    May I ask? Does this mean you believe, as you have put it, "Fundamentally, you cannot ever remove the slightest bit of suffering; you can do nothing that would add a quantum of happiness."? If so, maybe thinking, feeling, intuiting, or believing otherwise constructs the "simplest sufferer"? Or in this case perhaps it's the "simplest enjoyer"? But what's the difference?

    I think paining myself over whether I can let my computer suffer cannot be objectively resolved. I could put it through some grueling routine and think perhaps that it might be torturous for my poor computer to perform, but I cannot objectively know. If my computer is conscious, it might just as well feel fabulous performing this routine without breaking a sweat. There is no meter I could construct that could objectively indicate to me that it is suffering. Only my computer knows if it is suffering. The only way I can be sure my computer is not suffering would be to act as the simplest sufferer for it and not run the routine. Of course this would be a subjective decision, I can only imagine it is suffering. Yet I couldn't be sure that by sparing it I have not caused it the greatest pain. Perhaps it would rather render some 3d graphics instead of being retired to knock out that next blog. After all, that's what computers do. You could say it just wants to do the things it knows itself to do.

    I could say the same thing about an electron. I could say an electron is conscious. It knows itself as an electron. I does everything electrons do. But if I measure it, I inflict a kind of violence on it. I force it to take one state. It ceases to be all it can be. Should I wonder if it suffers in this state?

    I don't know if it suffers. I can only imagine it does. An electron or a computer is not a little baby. They cannot scream in pain. When and if their consciousness evolves to the point where they can represent their feelings to me in a way I can imagine them to mean, "Ouch, please stop!", I will not have to worry, or act as the simplest sufferer for them. I can only act on what I can consciously imagine, and then do what I can do. And yet my most generous actions as the simplest sufferer will not fundamentally change a thing. There will always be suffering in the world, perhaps not theirs, but mine. As the simplest sufferer, I may not be able to remove any suffering, but maybe it's enough just to move it. But that's all right, how else could I ever know joy?

    I could put it through some grueling routine and think perhaps that it might be torturous for my poor computer to perform, but I cannot objectively know.
    Why on earth should it be? The system does what it was made to do: number crunching. Why should an invisible, unprogrammed complex of emotions appear out of nowhere? You may as well speculate that two colliding protons in the LHC experience physical agony as they're ripped apart. 
    Only my computer knows if it is suffering.
    If your computer is capable of introspection and formulating coherent thoughts about itself then of course it will know. But to suggest that a PC has a load of hidden processing going on which can support that sort of high-level mental activity...

    What's the matter with everyone here? :)
     
    _
    How many under aged immigrant slaves are sexually tortured right now in California dungeons with nicely cared-for lawns outside?
    None. At least none for the reasons you suggest. Nobody rationalises torture on the basis that the victim does not "really" suffer, let alone that that this is because there is no such thing as real suffering. The perpetrators are evil bastards who enjoy inflicting pain.
     
    However you are right that it is BS. The hard problem is insoluble, not just hard - I admit I have been drawn into discussing it here as if it could be solved within the objective paradigm, which is precisely the error I am always banging on about. Mea culpa. Unfortunately we then run into the question of what to do with it and the only practical answer is to assume a "legal fiction" - systems are as conscious as they possibly can be. God knows why that should be so, if indeed it is. And no, that doesn't mean a thermostat longs to be loved. However, it does mean we can ask what is the simplest sufferer without getting bogged down in asking whether it is "really" suffering or giving up the whole quest just because of one difficulty.
    Gerhard Adam
    This learning requires conscious awareness of the relation between stimuli - the tone precedes and predicts the puff of air to the eye. This type of learning was not seen in the control subjects, volunteers who had been under anaesthesia.
    http://www.sciencecodex.com/scientists_find_that_individuals_in_vegetative_states_can_learn
    While not specific to this discussion, I thought this was an interesting aside.  So apparently such simplistic stimulus/response criteria are sufficient to establish "conscious awareness" in humans, but in animals, it is of no consequence or value at all.
    blue-green

    Gentlemen, will someone please drain the swamp so that we can see the gators.

    Consider this from Thor: “Going back to that "punch card baby" its important that you cannot have a state that represents suffering in one system represent joy in another.”

    First of all, has his youthful face ever seen a punch card or dealt with the indignity of handing a stack of them to an aloof guy behind a window with an IBM 360 in the background ... and then getting the usual report of syntax errors. That was my punch card baby.

    Second of all, there is no truth to the “important” fact that “you cannot have a state that represents suffering in one system represent joy in another.”

    What is for some a joyous bungee jump, or a new tattoo, or a body piercing or just spicy food, is terror to others. There is little accounting for taste. I see no “isomorphisms”.

    If any of you think there is some quantum foundation to consciousness, as Penrose suspected (a generation ago) while also (unlike Thor) dissing artificial intelligence, then please, state your cases plainly so that we can distinguish the crocks from the gators. Does anyone know what is the “modality error” that Mr. Potter accuses Sascha of doing ... or is it just smoke rings.

    At least we got a nice poem settled from it all.

    Quentin Rowe
    Second of all, there is no truth to the “important” fact that “you cannot have a state that represents suffering in one system represent joy in another.”

    You may know my view by now: qualia & physical are one and the same. With this in mind, you may not be surprised to find me disagreeing with the above. I put it that mood, emotion - internally generated qualia - have to have a matching physical state. Therefore, I agree with Thor's statement.

    What is for some a joyous bungee jump, or a new tattoo, or a body piercing or just spicy food, is terror to others. There is little accounting for taste. I see no “isomorphisms”.

    However, I do agree with the second quote above, except that I do see 'isomorphisms', for reasons shown above.

    So, to clarify where you stand, can you show your personal view as to the relationship between qualia and physical?

    Anyway, you are trying to get us back on-topic, and this is good. I have come to recognize I get easily thrown by Sasha's choice of vehicle for his ideas (in this case suffering). Whilst I considering it distracting, I accept it provokes a deeper look at the matter. All this thrashing about in the swamp is merely firming up the ground for further exploration.

    I've established a position - so the question for me is "does this position help us find Sasha's Simplest Sufferer?"

    i have a personal convenient technical meaning for "life" that will probably be scorned by everyone in the known rational universe. Ie. a self-sustaining, self-maintaining system. The simplest example of life in this case will be a whirlwind or whirlpool. 8-) Human beings are a kind of whirlwind. It's just that our whirlwind is in kinda slow motion, and we're complex with whirlwinds upon whirlwinds upon whirlwinds .. with the added bonus off spinning of whirlwinds from whirlwind patterns instead of just dying out.

    A meaning for suffering that might go along with this could be something like: the inability to self-maintain or self-sustain. Oh, umm ... yeh .. damage is a cause of suffering even tho it can be repaired .. so, i guess suffering is proportional to the degree of self-maintenance required. So, this can be at any level of being where one can have a sense of status-quo or ideal. Including emotional or spiritual. Ie. the degree of effort required to self-maintain is the degree of suffering in these self-maintaining systems.

    I'm not sure about consciousness. If we don't descend into the kind of religions that regard our particular kind of ape as special, then "consciousness" is related to a kind of self-regulating energy dynamic (regardless of material). Personally (prob because my education was in engineering) i *believe* (without a trace of rational evidence) that the self-maintaining, self-sustaining aspect of a system is the essential element of consciousness (not complexity). Ie. If a whirlwind has the essential quality of a "living" being (self-maintenance, self-sustining) then it is the atomic element of "consciousness".

    blue-green

    Whirlpools are fun. Here is a link to a video I made of some a few weeks ago. Watch closely to see how they form along certain boundary conditions.

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=grlw8YTX9hs&feature=relmfu

    For a higher quality and more recent video of what is powering the whirlpools upstream try this:

    http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H7S2t3y94MQ&feature=relmfu

    Of course, a whirlpool is no more conscious than is a thermostat.

    This whole blog is filed in the social science/philosophy&ethics wing of Science2.0. It is not in the physics department. It may well be that “consciousness” is outside of the scope of science. When you drain the swamp, I think this is the essence of the matter.

    To Mr. Potter's credit, he long ago published the Champagne Challenge ~ a case of champagne!
    Here is the link again.http://derekpotter.x10.mx/all/articles/consciousness.htm#win

    Mr. Potter's thesis is that there is no simplest suffering atom or seed or whatnot for science to manage consciousness. Nor is there a consciousness unit on some other scale or space for science. His thesis is that there is a sign along the road which says “Science Ends Here.” No more turtles, period.

    I am feeling convinced that this is indeed the case. This whole muddled blog is evidence.

    And yet, I'm reminded of other instances in which people said, “Science Stops Here.” A well published instance from 40 years ago reads as follows:

    “The paradox of collapse: physics stops, but physics must go on.”

    “A computing machine calculating ahead step by step the dynamical evolution of the geometry comes to the [singularity] where it can not go on. Smoke, figuratively speaking, starts to pour out of the computer. Yet physics surely continues to go on if for no other reason than this: Physic is by definition that which does go on its eternal way despite all the shadowy changes in the surface appearance of reality.”

    ((from Gravitation by Misner, Thorne & Wheeler, pages 1196,1197))

    40 years later, I suppose this sounds quaint and overstretched to some people. “The problems with singularities and collapse are solved.”

    The question here is whether it going to be so “easy” to bring consciousness under the umbrella of science? I suspect that Gerhard would say no, as long as we are honest as to what we mean by science and don't keep moving the goal posts.

    The problem is not that we run out of turtles, it's that the turtles become invisible to science.
    blue-green
    Turtles … invisible to science ..... Perhaps when their taxonomy and pedigree is established, they will seem-to-be-visible to science.  While checking for feedback on my invisible posts from yesterday, now hidden in the sub-conscious, I noticed that the day before, our-commander-in-chief was having an argument with a professional social scientist over what constitutes “science”. Twice Hank indicates that engineering is not a science because it is merely an applied science. Here is his 2nd exact quote:

    “I think applied psychology is quite good but, like engineering (which is applied physics), it is not science.”

    Perhaps this is splitting hares ... from tortoises; maybe I'm misrepresenting Hank's emphasis. Be that as it may, I could not but help think of the ways our invisible turtle activities can have the scent of science as soon as someone uses a calculator, an abacus or a cash register (especially one of those “smart ones” that sends those social “science” marketing signals ~ kind of like the way a bird flashes its feathers). A Hindu astrologist working through a convoluted sequence of time-based calculations, geometric symmetries and lookups is going through some of the same motions as a mathematical physicist. An artificial intelligence cannot tell whether he is doing science or not, even if distinguishing hoodoo from science can be a science.

    http://www.science20.com/science_20/blog/statistically_highly_unlikely_s...
    8-)

    > "Of course, a whirlpool is no more conscious than is a thermostat."

    8-)

    i can't believe you * utterly* missed a point - a thermostat isn't self-sustaining. It doesn't repair its existence via its environment. It doesn't continually manufacture and repair itself. Ie. a thermostat has no feedback with the environment with respect to maintaining it's existence. A whirlwind isn't a fixed material object. Ie^2 a whirlwind is an example of a self-sustaining, self-maintaining, entity - just like we are .. and just like thermostats aren't. A thermostat's state might adjust wrt its environment, but a whirlwind, like us, continually constructs itself from its environment. The whirlwind, like us, is an expression of it's environment. The whirlwind, like us, is materially dynamic. The thermostat isn't. The thermostat has the sophistication of a rock rolling down a hill. It just happens to be man made.

    re thermostat: I guess you could improve the parallel to the whirlwind by making it self repairing .. ie. include a thermostat repairman as part of the entitiy you define as "thermostat" - then it will satisfy the requirements for (non-thought) consciousness.

    .. and .. yeh "conscious"

    .. that's a fluffy word, isn't it. It can mean lots of things to lots of people - helped by the fact that we can't share the experience of anyone/thing else's sense of what "consciousness" is. The very idea that someone else uses the word in the way that we don't is ridiculous, isn't it.

    There's a whole foggy confused collection of these terms that get mixed up, isn't there .. "thought", "consciousness", "awareness", etc.. I'm using the term "consciousness" in the sense of "being" not "thought". It's an existential thing, dood. Brains aren't special for consciousness. For the whirlwind i'm suggesting "consciousness" is at the elemental level. Whereas, for you or i, consciousness might be at a higher level. (Assuming you exist and not some kind of text generating script)

    The quality of consciousness exists, so it's a quality that exists as part of the universe. I'm assuming there isn't a separate-from-the-universe source for consciousness (such as god) who might selectively anoint its favourite apes or organisms with the gift of consciousness. I'm suggesting the complexity of degree of materially self-sustaining feedback is a measure of consciousness. (The more usual, thoughtless measure of consciousness is the degree of empathy we have with the subject.)

    The brain increases the complexity of the loop, so consciousness is more complex. But the brain we're far too brain fixated .. the brain isn't the centre of being - it's the centre of thought. And thought isn't consciousness. Ie. the sense of "i" we have is our entire being .. not our brains. (Though for brained beings, the brain is a big part of the sophistication of the loop - why else would it be there if it wasn't?) I'm suggesting the degree of complexity of our self-sustaining existence is the factor of the depth and extent of our sense of "consciousness".

    Now, you may think, because i suggested a whirlwind has an elemental level of consciousness, then i'm suggesting it has the same level of consciousness as yourself. (Ie. as if consciousness is a switch .. it's either not there at all or at full human levels of a confused mass of consciousness, self-consciousness, thought, etc) But i though i was making it clear that the level of consciousness is the degree of self-sustaining complexity. Ie. whirlwind consciousness is elemental, not as sophisticated as yours.

    My aim in the above ill-thought out, jumbled prose is to bypass our human/brain/organism/material centred ideas about consciousness. I'm suggesting *degree* of consciousness is the complexity of a particular kind of energy dynamic (not of particular kinds of matter in particular arrangements - neuronal activity? .. pfft! .. just one case of being *part* of the consciousness loop.). And, for consciousness, it doesn't matter (ha!) in what material form that energy dynamic manifests. And the elemental, simplest form of that existence maintaining energy dynamic exists in the whirlwind (and not in the thermostat).

    I'm assuming that human beings aren't special .. we're just a complicated kind of whirlwind. A thermostat has the same kind of existence as a rock rolling down a hill. We, and whirlwinds, are more than that.
    8-)

    blue-green

    Pull yourself together man. Way back in 1977 I published an article that diagrams exactly the “self-sustaining” units of which you speak, borrowing from the ecosystem energetics of Howard T Odum. Of course, the units, just like you, need outside input to keep them from winding down via the ultimate drain and whirlwind, the heat-sinks throughout the diagrams that acknowledge the second law of thermo all the way up to the scale of black holes. There is even a measure of "qualities" of energy for your "*degree* of consciousness [that] is the complexity of a particular kind of energy dynamic."

    http://www.mountainlake.com/mlp/travel/CE77.pdf