A little while ago, I posted about whether or not potentially dangerous results should be published. The post revolved around two studies on avian flu which sparked some controversy over whether they should be published or not. There, I wrote that the US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (or NSABB) was considering the issue.
On 20 December, NSABB released a statement in which they outline their take on the matter. It reads:
Due to the importance of the findings to the public health and research communities, the NSABB recommended that the general conclusions highlighting the novel outcome be published, but that the manuscripts not include the methodological and other details that could enable replication of the experiments by those who would seek to do harm. The NSABB also recommended that language be added to the manuscripts to explain better the goals and potential public health benefits of the research, and to detail the extensive safety and security measures taken to protect laboratory workers and the public.
The editors-in-chief of both Science and Nature (rumored to be the journals to which the studies were submitted) have responded.
From Bruce Albert, editor-in chief of Science:
Science editors will be evaluating how best to proceed. Our response will be heavily dependent upon the further steps taken by the US government to set forth a written, transparent plan to ensure that any information that is omitted from the publication will be provided to all those responsible scientists who request it, as part of their legitimate efforts to improve public health and safety.
And from Philip Campbell, editor-in-chief of Nature:
We have noted the unprecedented NSABB recommendations that would restrict public access to data and methods and recognise the motivation behind them. It is essential for public health that the full details of any scientific analysis of flu viruses be available to researchers. We are discussing with interested parties how, within the scenario recommended by NSABB, appropriate access to the scientific methods and data could be enabled.
Here’s a video by the Office of Biotechnology Activities from the National Institutes of Health’s Office of Science Policy about dual-use research.
(Also, see part III, IV and V)
Reference
Butler, D. (2011). Fears grow over lab-bred flu. Nature. 480, pp. 421 – 422. 22 December. Doi:10.1038/480421a.
