And the flu-study saga goes on... (For some bakcground, see my previous posts: Dangerous Results I, II, III, IV, and V). Now, the World Health Organization has issued a statement that goes against the recommendation of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. Both studies, so the WHO says, should be published in full.
From the WHO's technical consultation:
In regards to the 'redaction option' proposed by NSABB, the WHO has this to say:
Of course, the WHO is not blind to the potential biosafety issues, and, as such, requires that the samples remain stored in their respective faciliteis, which have the second highest biosecurity level (BSL-3).
Further meetings will be held in order to deal with the issues arising from this type of research.
With things as they are now, the studies are set to be published in a few months in Science and Nature. The delay is needed in order to properly inform the public about the risks and benefits of the research. Also, the 60 day delay the researchers proposed earlier will be extended until a system is put into place for the review of biosafety and -security levels.
For more info:
Butler, D. (2012). Flu meeting opts for openness. Nature News. Published Online 21 February. doi:10.1038/482447a.
WHO Press Release.
List of participants in WHO consultation.
From the WHO's technical consultation:
There is a preference, from a public health perspective, for full disclosure of the information in these papers. However, there are significant social concerns surrounding this research. Two critical issues that must be addressed before publication of the papers are: (1) a focused communications plan to increase public awareness and understanding of the significance of these studies and the rationale for their publication, and (2) a review of the essential biosafety and biosecurity aspects of the newly developed knowledge.
In regards to the 'redaction option' proposed by NSABB, the WHO has this to say:
Participants discussed the concept of publication of redacted manuscripts with a mechanism for providing the restricted information to legitimate recipients. The group recognized the difficulty of rapidly creating and regulating such a mechanism in light of the complexity of international and national legislation. A consensus was reached that the redaction option is not viable to deal with the two papers under discussion in view of the urgency of the above mentioned public health needs. The participants noted there may be a need for such a mechanism in the future.
Of course, the WHO is not blind to the potential biosafety issues, and, as such, requires that the samples remain stored in their respective faciliteis, which have the second highest biosecurity level (BSL-3).
Further meetings will be held in order to deal with the issues arising from this type of research.
With things as they are now, the studies are set to be published in a few months in Science and Nature. The delay is needed in order to properly inform the public about the risks and benefits of the research. Also, the 60 day delay the researchers proposed earlier will be extended until a system is put into place for the review of biosafety and -security levels.
For more info:
Butler, D. (2012). Flu meeting opts for openness. Nature News. Published Online 21 February. doi:10.1038/482447a.
WHO Press Release.
List of participants in WHO consultation.
