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    Is Humanism False?
    By Samuel Kenyon | January 12th 2013 06:34 PM | 8 comments | Print | E-mail | Track Comments
    About Samuel

    Software engineer, AI researcher, user experience (UX) designer, actor, writer, atheist transhumanist. My blog will attempt to synthesize concepts...

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    Ryan Norbauer is pretty sure that:
    Not only are all religions manifestly false, but so too are all the secular narratives (humanism, positivism, liberalism, libertarianism) that, like religions, attempt to craft a system of positive values out of the epistemologically questionable notion that something can be transcendently and meaningfully true merely because it would be nice if that were the case. Reasoning by appeal to platitude or an implausible alternate-universe utopia is not reasoning at all. These facts may not delight us overmuch; they are still true.

    Of course I agree with the religious part of that statement. Yet he also kills off humanism. I'm certainly not the kind of gung-ho replacement-religion humanist like Greg Epstein, but perhaps whatever humanism appeals to is better than the alternatives for society as a whole, even if an individual need not believe in any narratives.

    And I'm not sure if humanism is a narrative. Of course, I'm not really a scholar in humanism--my Renaissance Man development is at the early stage of Renaissance Boy. I.e., I don't go around claiming to be a polymath, but I claim to strive to be a polymath.

    Certainly transhumanism is a narrative of the future--really several stories. A lot of transhumanists convert science fiction into prophecy and follow it religiously, thus reducing it to Norbauer's description. Should we instead look to narratives of the past?

    "Welcome to the twentieth century, out of which your century grew as surely as a column of black smoke grows from an oil fire."
    --Clive James

    In the book Cultural Amnesia, Clive James wrote about how few philosophical thinkers in the nineteenth century would doubt that the extension of human knowledge, primarily through science, would produce a race of the enlightened to lead a life of "mathematically calculated justice."
    By now, after the twentieth century has done its cruel work, that is exactly what we doubt. The future of science, Renan's cherished avenir de la science, can be assessed from our past, in which it flattened cities and gassed innocent children: whatever we don't yet know about it, the thing we already know is that it is not necessarily benevolent. But somewhere within the total field of human knowledge, humanism still beckons to us as our best reason for having minds at all.

    Poetic, but is humanism a reason? I suppose if we want to maintain civilization and culture then it is.
    Learned books are published by the thousand, yet learning was never less trusted as something to be pursued for its own sake. Too often used for ill, it is now asked about its use for good, and usually on the assumption that any goodwill be measurable on a market, like a commodity.
    ...
    If humanism that makes civilization civilized is to be preserved into this new century, it will need advocates. Those advocates will need a memory, and part of that memory will need to be of an age in which they were not yet alive.

    Perhaps what transhumanism should be is less of a cult of cults pretending that various science fictions are true and more of a science patch to humanism. Humanism already included science and learning in general. So the patch is not to add science, but to fix its use and expectations in culture. To advance by tuning the dangerous oscillations out of the civilization-science feedback system.

    Comments

    I really think the root cause of this existential malaise within secular humanism can be traced back to Hume's razor, the is/ought dichotomy that most educated, science-minded secular humanists adhere to. As long as it stands, then an honest analysis of moral philosophy must, in the end, admit to moral relativism. Part of the reason why the is/ought dichotomy stands, in my estimation, is another taboo amongst secular humanists, that of resisting any form of teleology, or in my preferred terminology, teleonomy, as a rational and empirically-based interpretation of evolution. There are certain inevitabilities that arise from the evolution of the laws of nature which govern our universe, life on habitable planets being one, and intelligence, including moral reasoning, a consequence of life's maturity. Morality is a socializing adaptation that is a game-theoretic inevitability, granted the species in question is given enough time to evolve. The latest controversies within evolutionary biology regarding multi-level selection theory shed light on a big piece of the puzzle as to why this view of evolution is so resisted--I think we may be experiencing a paradigm shift away from the 'selfish gene' view of biology that dominated the field for half a century or more as the exclusive interpretation, and in its stead, an updated framework which builds upon and extends the previous one that provides for a more fertile foundation to incorporate moral reasoning, as well as much of social science, within the explanatory purview of evolution. Lastly, I think theoretical advances in complex-systems theory and computational complexity theory (as applied to natural computation) may finally provide the analytical toolset in which to frame these theories on more rigorous grounds.

    vongehr
    is/ought dichotomy that most educated, science-minded secular humanists adhere to. As long as it stands, then an honest analysis of moral philosophy must, in the end, admit to moral relativism.
    moral relativism <=> is/ought divide
    However, positivist constructionism freezes out its own reference system and keeps only those components that would have been always the same in the end, however you got started, and employ a decision theory that bridges the is/ought divide by rationalizing utility in decision theory.
    resisting any form of teleology, or in my preferred terminology, teleonomy, as a rational and empirically-based interpretation of evolution.
    Because it is dangerously easy to get into justifying the status quo as the natural aim rather than whatever there happens to be in this relatively to itself actualized alternative.  As a method of enquiry, it is extremely error prone.
    Morality is a socializing adaptation that is a game-theoretic inevitability, granted the species in question is given enough time to evolve.
    And here it is that you commit exactly that mistake.  It is your own version of the Fermi paradox: Where are they all if morality is inevitable mature social structure?  I say: Rational systems are not just more intelligent, but at some point apply rationality self-referentially (doubt all arbitrary utilities, neo-enlightenment) and find out that individual ethical consclusions cannot be alligned with any socially evolved or even later evolving ones, except for a Global Suicide perhaps.
    Gerhard Adam
    Regardless of the paradigms, the "selfish gene" was never a rational explanation for evolution.  Even the notion of a morality as a socializing adaptation doesn't make any sense, since many organisms display a high degree of social structure without necessarily even possessing a nervous system.

    Teleonomy, as well as morality are intrinsic in life and therefore misinterpretations generally occur because we presume that humans are unique rather than merely rationalizing their differences.  We recognize that all organisms operate on "rules of behavior" that govern interactions, and this is no different than our notions of what constitutes moral behavior.

    What we consider to be the product of rational behavior is an incorrect interpretation, since it is a direct byproduct of our biology not intellect.  Failure to acknowledge such a condition would lead to fallacious conclusions regarding the behavior of other creatures based on their historical biology.  A point was made before about when it would be moral to kill infants, and the truth is that it is completely moral of you're a male lion.  Unless one is prepared to argue that male lions are behaving in an immoral manner, then one can only conclude that such a moral judgement is context dependent and absolutely dependent on the biology of the organism in question.

    In short, morality is little more than a codified form of "expected behavior".  Unlike ants, humans have the means to rationalize all manner of behaviors, so it would be expected that our society is held together with cognitive processes rather than something as simple as pheromones. 

    To conclude otherwise simply introduces another variation of mind/body dualism.  Everything that occurs [including morality] must be explainable by chemical processes, and there is increasing evidence that this is precisely how one can approach all such questions.  The notion of the "selfish gene" was simply a distraction that took the focus from what was self-evident.

    In my view, humanism is little more than an attempt to rationalize our social evolution as if it were something that we can direct and control. 
    vongehr
    Humanism is, like many isms, say speciesism, a tunnelvision inducing obsession.
    Reasoning by appeal to platitude or an implausible alternate-universe utopia is not reasoning at all.
    That imakes him suspicious, but maybe he means something else.  A sort of "alternate-universe" reasoning (though not utopia) is too often missing.
    If humanism that makes civilization civilized is to be preserved into this new century, it will need advocates. Those advocates will need a memory, and part of that memory will need to be of an age in which they were not yet alive.
    Translated: "I defend humanism even if I must pull back to the meta-level or trans-level to keep my face, and I like history, so it better be important to everybody."  I answer: Not even when accepting evolution theory as crucial must we necessarily focus on the consistent histories that can be constructed.
    I'm not sure what it means to say that Humanism is "true" or "false". This seems nonsensical to me. Humanism is not a set of claims as such. It is not a prophesy that a utopia will, indeed, come to pass in the future. Nor, is it a set of claims that x is objectively true. It is simply this: a choice. A choice to apply ourselves toward certain goals in order to move closer toward the kind of world in which we (who sign on) wish to live. This is simply a matter of sheer will, arising (no doubt) from our deeper biologically evolved drives for prosperity, happiness, and progress. Humans want a better world; just as a bear wants honey or a salmon wants to reproduce - these are simple facts. We can use our reason toward those ends, or we can reject reason and suffer the consequences. But, after applying ourselves to these values, will we - in fact - prevail? We cannot know that, but we do know that we must live in *some* kind of manner. Therefore, we choose those values which have been summarized and given the label 'Humanism'.

    Daniel Strain
    Humanist minister
    PS - It is a misconception to read the word 'Humanism' and think it has to do with specieism. Humanists were at the forefront of the animal rights movement and remain there today. See:
    http://humanistcontemplativeblog.blogspot.com/2009/07/does-humanism-excl...

    SynapticNulship
    I'm not sure what it means to say that Humanism is "true" or "false". This seems nonsensical to me.
    I was hoping somebody would notice that. The phrase came out of that first quote from Norbauer, and I left it like that because it was thought provoking. Does it make any sense to say that a secular narrative is false? You might say that a story is not true because it is fiction, for instance religious stories. But with humanism I'm not sure if there is a single narrative, and certainly with transhumanism there are many narratives. Or you might argue that humanism is not to be equated with narratives at all in which case it is a choice as you describe and not interpretable as having a boolean value.

    However, if you want humanism to be disassociated from fictional stories, using Christian church terms like "minister" might not help. Of course, I know there are reasons to set up these churches without religion. It's the next stage after the Unitarian Universalist churches which were in turn more reasonable than the old single-religious venues. Slowly remove all the religious stuff, and the mythologies and hate, but keep the social structure that a lot of people like (not me, but others seem to like church gatherings and "worship" and ministers and whatnot).
    Gerhard Adam
    Actually I took the question to mean whether the premise of humanism was true or false.  The premise being the codification of human behavior.

    I've always been suspicious of any codified system because invariably it does little to affect actual behavior, but provides a great deal of rationalization for people to consider themselves living life correctly.  After all, anyone that disagrees is presumed to be doing something wrong, so I fail to see how this helps strengthen society.

    Just as the legal system doesn't control behaviors, neither do religious ideals.  As I said, they invariably serve as kind of a checklist where people can review their behaviors and declare themselves to be "good".  In reality all the positive behaviors are those that already intrinsic in the individual's character and were largely achieved by the acquisition of values that have been internalized [usually from parenting].
    vongehr
    I took it to mean whether humanism as a call to action that promises a good outcome for humans is inconsistent (false in that it is the false move for what it wants to achieve).