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    Your Visual System Is Lying
    By Samuel Kenyon | September 6th 2010 01:59 AM | 10 comments | Print | E-mail | Track Comments
    About Samuel

    Software engineer, AI researcher, user experience (UX) designer, actor, writer, atheist transhumanist. My blog will attempt to synthesize concepts...

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    Does a hill feel steeper when you are already exhausted?  Does a hill appear steeper when you are afraid to roll down it?  Is it true that baseballs appear larger to players when they are hitting well? You may have some suspicions that your perception is greatly affected by your context and may not always be correct.  

    Psychologists Dennis R. Proffitt (University of Virginia) and Jessica Witt (now at Purdue University) have performed some interesting experiments in recent years dealing with perception and action.  Christof Koch, professor of biology and engineering at the California Institute of Technology and popular writer, described some of them in his column in the July 2010 issue of Scientific American Mind [1].

    In the slant experiments [2], subjects were asked to estimate the slope of a hill with two different visual tasks:



    1. Visual matching: Adjust a line on a flat disk to indicate the slant.




    2. Haptic: Adjust the slant of a movable board with your hands without looking at the hands.






    Koch didn't mention this, but according to Witt and Proffitt, the two tasks in the experiment are supposed to be absolute, in that the slant of the hill is measured of itself, not compared to anything else.  They had a third task used in previous experiments which was relative in that it compared the slant to the ground plane.  So the new "absolute" disk was introduced to attempt to filter out task differences from the results.

    Experiment 1 had the subjects look at the hill head on (pitch).  Task 1 (matching) was not very accurate: 31 degrees was perceived steeper, around 50 degrees, and 22 degrees was perceived as steeper also (in between 30 and 40 degrees).  However, Task 2 (haptic) was accurate.

    In previous studies, visual matching and verbal reports were even more inaccurate when the subjects were encumbered, tired, unhealthy, or elderly, yet the haptic task was not influenced.

    In experiment 2, the subjects could see the slant of hill from the side (a cross-section).  Yet they still over-estimated the slant with visual matching despite that they could actually hold the disk up in their visual field and match the line to the slant.  The haptic tasks were still accurate.

    The researchers concluded that these results support the theory that we have two independent visual systems, one for explicit awareness, and one that is visuomotor for immediate actions.

    As Koch explains [1]:
    Proffitt argues that perception is not fixed: it is flexible, reflecting a person’s physiological state. Your conscious perception of slant depends on your current ability to walk up or down hills—hard work that should not be undertaken lightly. If you are tired, frail, scared or carrying a load, your assessment of the hill—the one that guides your actions—will differ from what you see. Not by choice, but by design. It is the way you are wired.
    The Enactive Approach to Perception


    I am reminded of the book Action in Perception, in which philosopher Alva Noë said
    [3, p.228]:
    Perceptual experience, according to the enactive approach, is an activity of exploring the environment drawing on knowledge of sensorimotor dependencies and thought.
    It seems that the slant perception experiments mesh with the enactive approach.  Again, from Noë [3, p.105]:
    To see that something is flat is precisely to see it as giving rise to certain possibilities of sensorimotor contingency.  To feel a surface as flat is precisely to perceive it as impeding or shaping one's possibilities of movement.
    But, you might argue, the enactive approach doesn't account for why Task 2 (haptic) is more accurate--wouldn't the enactive approach predict that Task 2 is as skewed as Task 1?  However, one of the things Noë attempted to argue was that we always have dual experiences even if we don't realize it:


    1. How things are to us in experience.



    2. How things look.  Normally this is transparent, but one can, with some effort, see how things present themselves visually, e.g. when an artist is painting a depiction.







    So, this hypothetical solution indicates that the Task 2, operating on the action-oriented visuomotor stream, provides data as one can achieve with the techniques of artists.

    Turning the Tables
    Koch started off his column by invoking the two vision systems theory (which is what the slant experiment was trying to prove) [1]:
    As psychologists and neuroscientists have discovered over the past several decades, our consciousness provides a stable interface to a dizzyingly rich sensory world. Underneath this interface lurk two vision systems that work in parallel. Both are fed by the same two sensors, the eyeballs, yet they serve different functions. One system is responsible for visual perception and is necessary for identifying objects—such as approaching cars and potential mates—independent of their apparent size or location in our visual field. The other is responsible for action: it transforms visual input into the movements of our eyes, hands and legs. We consciously experience only the former, but we depend for our survival on both.
    So isn't that enough of a description--doesn't it annihilate the enactive approach?  Noë addressed the two visual systems theory, but spent little more than a page on it, dismissing it as orthogonal to the enactive approach.  Noë states that both visual streams depend on deployment of sensorimotor skills [3, p.19].

    However, the slant perception studies actually lend support to the enactive approach--there are sensorimotor relations to both the visuomotor stream and the explicit awareness stream.  The awareness perceptions are modulated by sensorimotor skills as they apply to a person's current context, which is why Task 1 results in inaccurate perceptions.   Meanwhile, the visuomotor stream is tied into in a quicker, tighter loop that skips the slower type of aware perceptual processing that the other stream uses, which is why Task 2 is accurate.

    In other words, both visual systems use sensorimotor skills, but in different ways, thus giving support to the enactive approach.


    References
    [1] Koch, C., "Looks Can Deceive: Why Perception and Reality Don't Always Match Up," Scientific American Mind, July 2010.
    [2] Witt, J. K.,&Proffitt, D.R., "Perceived slant: A dissociation between perception and action," Perception, vol. 36, pp. 249-257, 2007.
    [3] Noë, A., Action in Perception, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004.

    Image credits:




    1. Stefan Jannson




    2. Samuel H. Kenyon




    3. Samuel H. Kenyon




    4. most uncool




    Comments

    Aitch
    It seems to me, not so much that my visual system is lying, as the title suggests, but that our perceptual mind adjusts, not only according to mood, but to our current world model, our perceived place in that world, and also, perhaps an element of wish fulfillment
    The piece seems to focus more on perception, .....'the mind's eye', as determined by slope experiments, rather than the real world experiments to determine exactly what affects the perceptual system, to bring about changes to 'our stable consciousness interface', and if there are changes which we initiate by choice, or chance

    Aitch
    SynapticNulship
    The "lying" refers to difference in reported information between the two visual systems.  The ventral stream (perceptual representation and identification) is lying in that is it not accurate.  Of course, there's nothing wrong with that.  You could chose to describe it as "adjustment", but I wanted to use a stronger word that brings to attention that there are radically different versions of reality between the visual streams and between different contexts.

    However, I am very skeptical of claims that one version of reality is veridical, as Koch claims.  So "lying" of perception may not be absolute either, just relative to another version of reality.
    rather than the real world experiments to determine exactly what
    affects the perceptual system, to bring about changes to 'our stable
    consciousness interface', and if there are changes which we initiate by
    choice, or chance

    Yes, that's a good point.  I plan on doing some future articles on the subject.  Perhaps I should focus some time on the triggers and types of perceptual changes happening in the system.
    Gerhard Adam
    Am I missing something, because this all seems rather obvious.  The visual system was never intended to provide accurate measurements, but only perceptions about likely things that might affect someone physically, so it would seem that exaggerations would be more useful to avoid unnecessary risk.  In other words, it is better to perceive something as steeper and over-estimate than to commit yourself physically and get into trouble later.  More specifically this would be especially true if you were climbing down some surface.

    I've noticed the same thing in a plane where looking out the window it may appear that the plane is almost at a 90 degree angle to the ground, whereas in reality it isn't likely more than 10 degrees in a turn.  The same thing occurs when an airport moving walkway isn't running.  There's always an awkward moment when you step on it, where you brain expects the walkway to be moving, and your physical system responds in anticipation of it, which invariably makes you look clumsy as you adjust to the fact that it isn't moving.  In that circumstance, your eyes may still insist that you are "seeing" movement.

    So, the obvious part to me, seems that the visual system is only needed for approximations, while the physical system must cope with movement in three dimensions where approximations may get you killed.  So it would seem the physical system would be more highly accurate.

    After all, isn't that the reason why you shouldn't look down when you're in high places?  Isn't that effectively telling you to trust your physical system instead of your visual one?
    Bonny Bonobo alias Brat
    I agree that it seems that the brain is constantly interpreting the visual input and creating perceptions that are not necessarily accurate but that are hopefully useful. I have an astygmatism which means that my eyeballs are not the perfect oval that they should be, and the visual input is constantly skewed accordingly, yet I have 20/20 vision as long as I'm not tired. I didn't even know I had an astygmatism even though I've probably had it all of my life, until I had 2 babies under the age of 3, and I noticed that on several occasions, when I was exhausted and feeding the baby in the middle of the night, my vision was blurred and I couldn't read the clock, but then it would be fine again next morning. I had my eyes tested and the optometrist explained that I had an astygmatism and that my brain had probably been too tired to make the adjustment in the middle of the night. It was good because I had some glasses made for driving when I'm tired, if for some reason it can't be avoided, which happens quite often now that the babies are teenagers who need to be driven everywhere.
    Make love not war
    SynapticNulship
    It may indeed be obvious.  What is new in my article is that I have proposed that this perception research, which was presented by Christof Koch--an internalist--may actually support an externalist framework (the enactive approach).
    Bonny Bonobo alias Brat
    According to Wikipedia "In contemporary epistemology, internalism about justification is the idea that everything necessary to provide justification for a belief must be immediately available to an agent's consciousness. Externalism in this context is the view that factors other than those internal to the believer can affect the justificatory status of a belief." It also says that "At a fundamental level, enactivism is anti-dualist. There is no "core" self, but there is rather an enchained set of context-dependent associations that collectively provide a point-of-view in approaching the momentary problems of being. In this sense, individuals can be seen to "grow into" the world." ..."Enactivism, therefore is the middle ground between the two extremes [Tree of Knowledge, pgs. 133,134,253]. Maturana and Varela use this term to "confront the problem of understanding how our existence-the praxis of our living- is coupled to a surrounding world which appears filled with regularities that are at every instant the result of our biological and social histories.... to find a via media: to understand the regularity of the world we are experiencing at every moment, but without any point of reference independent of ourselves that would give certainty to our descriptions and cognitive assertions. Indeed the whole mechanism of generating ourselves, as describers and observers tells us that our world, as the world which we bring forth in our coexistence with others, will always have precisely that mixture of regularity and mutability, that combination of solidity and shifting sand, so typical of human experience when we look at it up close."[Tree of Knowledge, pg. 241]" Samuel, you point out "However, the slant perception studies actually lend support to the enactive approach--there are sensorimotor relations to both the visuomotor stream and the explicit awareness stream. The awareness perceptions are modulated by sensorimotor skills as they apply to a person's current context, which is why Task 1 results in inaccurate perceptions. Meanwhile, the visuomotor stream is tied into in a quicker, tighter loop that skips the slower type of aware perceptual processing that the other stream uses, which is why Task 2 is accurate. In other words, both visual systems use sensorimotor skills, but in different ways, thus giving support to the enactive approach. From what I have just read and quoted and what you have said I would have to agree.
    Make love not war
    SynapticNulship
    Thank you for looking up the material.  There is of course issues of epistemology when you get into the various types of content that various approaches take, but as for definitions I would start with philosophy of mind:
    Externalism is a group of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that the mind is not only the results of what is going on inside the nervous system (or the brain) but also of what either occur or exist outside the subject. It is often contrasted with internalism which holds that the mind emerges out of neural activity alone. [wikipedia]


    It also says that "At a fundamental level, enactivism is anti-dualist.

    Indeed.  To some that may seem paradoxical, because an internalist neuroscience perspective would think that any mental explanation outside of neural states means invoking dualism.  But that is not the case for externalism that considers mind as a result of a brain-body-environment dynamic process.
    Gerhard Adam
    In looking at some of the information regarding Christof Koch and a few other articles that deal with issues like the singularity and computer intelligence, I'm struck by the fact that it seems everyone is asking the wrong questions.

    Nevertheless, some in the singularity crowd are confident that we are within a few decades of building a computer, a simulacrum, that can experience the color red, savor the smell of a rose, feel pain and pleasure, and fall in love.
    http://spectrum.ieee.org/biomedical/imaging/can-machines-be-conscious
    It seems to me that this is entirely irrelevant, as if a particular wavelength of light is something that is subject to interpretation as an objective piece of information.

    The question should be ... why do we perceive red?  What value does it provide to be able to differentiate some frequencies of electromagnetic radiation and not others?  It's only within this context that we can determine whether a particular sense is important.

    Unless the color red is important to a machine, it would simply be a simulation.  What's the point in tasting food if you don't need it for nourishment?  Humans don't have the same sense of smell as most animals, so which would be more important to provide to a machine?  A dog's sense or a human's?  Even then, what possible relevance would it hold for the machine?

    It's like the old "if a tree falls in the woods and there's no one around, does it make a sound?"  This is an absurdity.  Of course, it makes a sound, since we specifically evolved to hear it.  If it didn't, then there's no benefit for natural selection to favor creatures that can hear.

    Similarly, our visual perception is confined to the band of electromagnetic radiation that conveys the most useful information to us, while to other animals, other bands of the spectrum are more relevant (i.e. infrared).

    From a philosophical perspective, it doesn't matter whether we perceive things in a similar fashion, since the only point is that we agree to the significance of a particular phenomenon.  Perhaps red looks different to you than it does to me.  Certainly we know from other senses, like taste, that different individuals may like or dislike the same foods based on their own perceptions, so it's not out of the question to presume that other interpretations from other senses may be similarly varied.  Usually people have different favorite colors.  What does that even mean?

    I suppose the point is that our environment existed before we did.  Therefore it would suggest that whatever existed, would be the impetus that determined our own evolutionary development to extract relevant information to enhance our own survival.  From this, it would seem obvious that everything we experience and interpret would have to be within the context of the environment we are in. 

    Maybe I'm missing the point, but internalism doesn't seem to have any basis as an explanation, since it would suggest that our brains and perceptions evolved independently of the environment they interpret.
    SynapticNulship
    I agree with you.  I guess someone would have to chart the history of scientific and applied research and memes to see how we got to this point.  I suspect that increase of specialization has not helped at all.
    Aitch
    It seems to me that this 'black or white' internal or external dichotomy is in itself a fallacy Why does there need to be an either or? Why not a both? each as is necessary? Sometimes I feel as though the rigours of Science actually blind people to explanations of the mind, as if it were just a set of computerised logic gates What part of being can be explained as internal or external that truly exist in the heart, yet becomes analysed into being something just a shadow of itself? Helen cited, "At a fundamental level, enactivism is anti-dualist. There is no "core" self, but there is rather an enchained set of context-dependent associations that collectively provide a point-of-view in approaching the momentary problems of being. In this sense, individuals can be seen to "grow into" the world." No 'core' self??? Oh really??? Sorry, this is just logical fallacy by one who has no soul, IMO Unless the head by channelled through the heart, no sense can be made of this world, or the individuals in it That comes from the mind's eye, which has no need of lying, deceit, or fooling of the bodies motor control mechanisms.....it will not make you fall of escalators or mountains, but it may well help you fall off your misconceptions Aitch