If this NPR report is any indication, it appears that the discussion of Iran's nuclear ambitions are moving in the right direction (i.e., toward the position I staked out vis a vis North Korea on its own little lonely island way back in May, which is similarly applicable to Iran-its just that Iran had recently conducted a missile test).

The position had the following key points:
1. The regime is not suicidal
2. Obtaining a nuclear weapon gives a regime significant bargaining power
3. Creating doubt that the regime might be suicidal through rhetoric increases the bargaining power generated by such a weapon.
4. Acknowledging the above points and engaging in a policy of active deterrence can mitigate the threat.

Some experts are starting to agree:

The core argument that critics of deterrence make is that Iran is
undeterrable — because Iran's president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and other
leaders are fanatics who believe in religious apocalypse. Nuclear war
could suit their purposes, this argument goes, even if Iran used the
bomb and the U.S. retaliated.

Thomas Fingar, former deputy director of national intelligence and now a scholar at Stanford University, disagrees.

"I don't think this is a suicidal regime. I don't dismiss out of hand at all the idea that they could be deterred," he says.

And, it is pointed out later in the article that this rational approach has worked before, with regimes that have had no qualms about the deaths of millions. 
"Mao Zedong and Josef Stalin make Ahmadinejad look like a Boy Scout. And
I'm not belittling the worrisome nature of Ahmadinejad and the Iranian
regime. But we have dealt with far, far worse," he says.
Because although those regimes may have had other psychiatric issues, they were not suicidal.

Heard it hear first, folks.