NEW YORK, June 10 /PRNewswire/ --

DCML LLC announced that it has filed a Schedule 13D with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC"), indicating its acquisition of a more than a 5% interest in the outstanding Ordinary Shares of Danka Business Services PLC (OTC Bulletin Board: DANKY) and including the following letter addressed to the Board of Directors of Danka opposing the proposed liquidation of Danka after the anticipated sale of Danka Office Imaging Company to Konica Minolta:

DCML LLC 595 Madison Avenue, 17th floor New York, NY 10020 +1-212-332-3342 June 09, 2008 The Board of Directors c/o Danka Business Systems PLC Masters House, 107 Hammersmith Road 11101 Roosevelt Blvd London W14 0QH England St. Petersburg, FL 33716

Dear Members of the Independent Committee of the Board of Directors:

We write on behalf of DCML LLC, and certain related entities that own, in the aggregate, approximately 6% of the common stock of Danka Business Systems PLC (the "Company") on a fully diluted basis.

We support the Board's decision to recommend shareholder approval of the sale of Danka Office Imaging Company ("DOIC") to Konica Minolta ("KOM"). However, we believe the Independent Committee (the "Committee") has seriously erred in (1) recommending that the Company enter liquidation subsequent to such sale; (2) conditioning sale of DOIC upon shareholder approval of liquidation, and (3) negotiating a distribution of sale proceeds in liquidation that would leave ordinary shareholders with a pittance -- US$6.5 million (US$0.025 per ordinary share, or US$0.10 per American Depository Share), while holders of participating shares (the "Cypress shareholders") would receive substantially in excess of US$100 million.

The proposed distribution to ordinary shareholders is grossly unfair, and we strongly believe that the Company could have pursued -- and going forward must pursue -- alternative options for executing the sale of DOIC to KOM while ensuring that the value derived from such sale is shared more equitably among all of the company's shareholders. The Committee's failure to do so raises serious questions about the exercise of its fiduciary duties.

In the Company's proxy filing, the Board has implied that the proposals presented -- calling for a voluntary liquidation, which disproportionately benefits the Cypress shareholders (as well as company management and its bankers and lawyers) -- is the only realistic option available following the sale of DOIC to KOM. It is repeatedly suggested that the failure to approve the proposed transactions, exactly as presented, will likely place the company in irreversible fiscal peril. We believe that any such implication regarding the Company's fiscal soundness is factually incorrect, a biased gloss on the circumstances, designed to elicit shareholder votes in favor of the Board's proposals.

Ultimately, the Board's core justification for granting Cypress shareholders more than 17x the distribution that will be given to ordinary shareholders is that the Cypress shareholders' liquidation preference compels this outcome in a voluntary liquidation. But this merely begs the question of why the company necessarily must be liquidated following the sale of DOIC. Nowhere has the Board seriously attempted to explain this very convenient logical leap. In the absence of liquidation, the Cypress shareholders are minority shareholders and as an equitable matter should be treated as such.

1. Equitable Distribution Analysis

On December 17, 1999, the Company issued 218,000 6.50% participating shares, for US$218 million, to the Cypress shareholders. Today these shares have accrued to approximately US$372 million in value. The participating shares held by Cypress are equity securities for purposes of English law and represent equity for purposes of U.K. GAAP.(1)

In the event of a change of control, the participating shareholders may demand redemption of their shares. If the Company does not have sufficient distributable profits to redeem the participating shares in cash, it must use its best efforts to complete a fresh issuance of shares, which in our opinion is highly unlikely to be successful at the current market value of the ordinary shares. As an alternative to cash redemption of the participating shares at the "as converted " ordinary share value, the Company may elect instead to convert the participating shares into ordinary shares at a conversion price of US$3.11 per ordinary share, or US$12.44 per ADS (2).

Notably, if the Company were to convert the participating shares into ordinary shares, participating shareholders would receive approximately 120,851,920 ordinary shares, representing 32% of the total shares outstanding.(3) And if the proceeds from the sale of DOIC were to be distributed (after paying off the Company's debt) after such conversion, ordinary shareholders would receive 68% of the proceeds, and Cypress shareholders, then holding ordinary shares, would receive 32% of the proceeds. Consistent with this analysis, we summarize in the table below what we believe is a fair and equitable distribution to all shareholders.

(US$ in millions, except per share) ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Liquidation Analysis 12/31/2007 (4) Best Case Worst Case ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Konica Minolta Proceeds $250 $240 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Add: Current Assets at Danka $25 $25 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Less: Current Liabilities at Danka $8 $8 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Less: GE debt repayment $122 $122 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Less: Inv. Banking & Legal Fees $14 $14 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Less: Mr. Frazier Payment $4 $4 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Less: Management Payment $5 $5 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Net Asset Value $122 $112 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Ordinary share distribution $83 $76 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- Participating share distribution $39 $36 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- $ per ADS share $1.28 $1.18 ------------------------------------------------------------------------- $ per participating share $1.28 $1.18

The distribution detailed above sharply contrasts with what the Board has proposed and the Committee has endorsed -- namely paying Cypress in the best case US$115 million or 3.80 per ADS or in the worst case US$105 million or US$3.48 per ADS, after making payment to the ordinary and ADS shares of less than US$7 million (US$0.10 per ADS). Interestingly, and for purposes of comparison, it is worth noting that Company management will receive cash benefits resulting from the proposed transaction that are substantially greater than the entire distribution being made to ordinary shareholders.

We recognize that the proposed outcome, and its remarkable deviation from the analysis above, is a function of the Board's decision to liquidate the company; in liquidation, the participating shareholders merit a distribution preference. But as we previously noted, the Board has failed entirely to explain why liquidation is required in these circumstances, especially given the harsh, anti-ordinary shareholder outcome that results in liquidation.

It is also hard to understand why, before endorsing this outcome, the Board did not secure a fairness opinion from its financial advisor that a distribution of less than US$7 million to ordinary and ADS shares is fair and reasonable. In a thorough and diligent process, the Board would have obtained such an opinion.

2. The Company's Financial Condition

The upshot of the Board's proxy argument is that the Company is in financial peril, and only the proposed transaction -- only the transaction at issue, and none other -- can somehow save it. As an initial matter, it is difficult to take seriously this argument when the Company hasn't filed financial statements since December 31, 2007. As shareholders we do not accept -- and we should not be asked to accept -- the Board's contentions and innuendo regarding Company finances until and unless we are presented with up-to-date financials.

Second, and equally important, in our view the Company's potential liquidity difficulties can be negotiated and surmounted. Given our understanding of the working capital dynamics affecting the Company's business, and its credit facilities, we believe that the proxy has not accurately portrayed the universe of options available to the Company short of bankruptcy or liquidation. Simply put, the Company should be able to meet its obligations under its GE credit line through the use of conventional financial management strategies; these obligations are in no way justification for liquidation.

In conclusion, we are not opposed to the sale of DOIC to KOM at the proposed price. It is clear however that the Board has failed its majority shareholders in negotiating the Cypress transaction. For the reasons detailed above, we have concluded that we cannot support the voluntary liquidation of the Company and intend to vote against it. We are hopeful that a voluntary liquidation will not occur and are considering all of the options available to us, including soliciting proxies in the upcoming annual meeting in August.

Finally, we wish to note as shareholders our appreciation of the great work the Company's employees have done and continue to do in operating the business.

Sincerely, /s/ Robert Andrade /s/ Rosty Raykov Robert Andrade Rosty Raykov (1) From page 8, based on the November 24, 1999 Proxy Statement. (2) From page 14, based on the November 24, 1999 Proxy Statement. (3) From page vi, based on the May 30, 2008 Proxy Statement. (4) From page H-24, based on the May 30, 2008 Proxy Statement.

DCML LLC, 595 Madison Avenue, 17th floor, New York, NY 10020, +1-212-332-3342