There is such "law": The world in mechanical device, where no other qualities except the causality of events exist. Physics have no other essence. Kant told that there is no way to know thing-in-itself and many believe this elitary lie with all it's implications done long after Kant.
I count a few ways the mechanical world view affects our current world:
- Scientists generally read texts, which answer to some basic quality criteria - every day, tens of thousands of scientific texts are written. Base philosophy is the actual way to decide, which texts are probably true and which are not. As there are many cutting-edge texts, only ones read are cutting-edge texts, which are also probably true.
- There are a lot of theories and works, which are not in sync with mechanical world view - they talk about empirical data, which is not probable by mechanical world view. As base philosophy is mechanical world view, those texts are counted as less probable and thus checked with lower probability.
- To write scientifically means one thing: to be repeatable. Repeatable means ideally that anyone should be able to check your basics with no money, no special talent or knowledge, not work and in no time. Such repeatability means that even if you get your knowledge from complex experiments and observations, you must get them down to roots, which are easy to check.
- To write philosophically means also one thing: to be general. General means ideally that what you say, is true in any context and will be important base knowledge, which shapes many areas and works.
At the end of this text there is an outline, which allows to easily check all steps of logic.
So. Logically - there is no way to know thing-in-itself. There is no way to experience it. There is no way, specifically, to say anything about anything except the causal qualities of nature. This is mechanical world view. There is logic, but there is also a set of hidden beliefs or prejudices in that - lets be exact, those are not things science has found out. Those are first axioms taken from air to set up the first axiomatic system of science itself. They are also, logically - by deduction from themselves - not falsifiable. As they are taken not falsifiable and they are defined to be simple. This is a complex philosophical question if they are simple or not - simplicity has it's subjective aspect -, but we don't have to struggle with this question; what should be our prime interest is if they are correct or wrong, not if they are simple or complex.
So, as we see - there are several basic points, which allow us to logically deduct that any statement about any thing-in-itself is impossible, thus science can't state anything about things-in-themselves and thus, scientifically, there simply is no thing-in-itself. It can't be in any scientific theory and it's not falsifiable, thus it does not exist.
Ok, this is a theoretical ground to what we call empiricism, physicalism or whatever similar - the mechanical world view.
Now, to go further - as there is no thing-in-itself (although logically it must be exist - it must be exist and we must be unaware of it), there are no emotions, no matter and nothing except the causality of
In this scheme, many scientists have had a strong pressure to explain somehow, how we feel. The "solution" they have found - that the mind, emotion and thought is actually a complex mathematical system. This means - by building a computer program complex enough, we can create real mind feeling as real feelings as we do. Thus, by simply writing those formulas to paper as a routine job - lets imagine a generations of scientists, who are doing routine calculations with paper and pencil
without even knowing what they do, the calculations are about movement of particles in human body. This, by the "mathematical complexity theory of mind" as I might call it, will generate some feeling - say, pain - over time in this entity existing only on paper.
From this solution we could imply that there is necessary and sufficient conditions for mathematical calculation, which effectively generates a feeling. I mean - if I do some specific calculation on paper, this, in effect, will produce something, which has all the same qualities with some human feeling or subset of it. I think that this claim is absurd if we don't have any mathematical concepts to actually
prove any feeling - I can't prove that some calculation is a feeling. In addition I think that this makes the world no simpler - this might be, in first sight, a very simple theory to explain all complexities away from mystery of life, but it actually produces a lot more and seems, in more profound analysis, simply an absurd. I know no physical means to differentiate a calculation from another - for example, our calculations could be carried out by people, who don't know even the meaning of those numbers (this adds a lot of conditions - for example we must be sure that any other interpretation of numbers and symbols, which gives the same results, is effectively taken as the same condition). One would say that it has something to do with reacting in real world - but what is the fundamental difference between intelligent reactions and reactions, which have been determined by someone, who knew all events in advance? Or - some mathematical process in virtual world, in this case, would be less alive than the same process in real world.
We also do not have just a fantasy about the experiences - like feelings -, since fantasy is experience itself.
Now, lets go to other side. Bertrant Russel in his introduction to philosophy states something, what has been a common knowledge and certain fact over the history of philosophy - only thing, which we can really know existing for sure is our experience. Schopenhauer in his "World as Will and Idea" has gone further and tries to make it clear, what the thing-in-itself actually is - impossible for Kant.
So, where was Kant wrong? What we can imply from him being wrong?
Kant was wrong in one thing - we actually know, what we feel, and we have all means to reflectively make really sure that we do. We do have an experience about the world. And, in addition - this fact about our knowledge of this fact effectively disproves not only this "innocent" belief that we have no feelings or that things-in-themselves are impossible to describe (as they have no causal effect), but it has a wide variety of implications.
1. First implication - we actually can speak about things-in-themselves
This has more implications. If we can know and speak about things-in-themselves, then their connection with reality - connection of our experiences - must not only exist, but it must be perfectly
synchronized with causal connections on very fundamental level. I mean, there must be harmonious causality between we feeling something and we expressing that feeling - we can actually express that the feeling is there. Feeling has a means to be expressed in causal world - thus, the connection between feeling and causal world must be meaningful.
Physical events and their corresponding emotions haven't, thus, just a random connection - otherwise the Kantian belief would be true. Emotions have a real connection - lets call it harmony - with actual
causal events. And that solution will break most of philosophy about human mind or the relation between consciousness and reality.
2. Second implication - Our will must have actually real effect on world
Our will has an effect over our hands, our thoughts and our feelings. This effect is such that when we deeply will something, then the felt meaning of this will is exactly what is going to happen. Will and experience are in harmony. And that makes the will be a fundamental force, giving, for example, right to Schopenhauer. By the way, those effects must exist on quantum level, also, so the task set by "quantum mysticians" is thus philosophically substantiated even if different theories of them can't possibly be all true.
3. How the fundamental connection of experience and reality must develop.
There are actually only two reasonable possibilities - that the connection is given or that the connection has strong evolutionary advantage.
First hypotheses states that wherever the physical conditions for having an experience of will are satisfied, also the physical conditions of having some force moving things to willed direction must be
Second hypotheses states that bodies, which have the conditions stated in first hypotheses met, will have some evolutionary advantage - more energy, more flexibility, ability to get some information from some source of creativity or some other complex set of qualities necessary to achieve evolutionary advantage. This cosmic principle must work at least here on earth, but it seems to be a kind of principle, which will be in effect in the whole universe if it is in effect on earth.
I think that the reality is in between those two hypotheses - some mixture of them.
4. How it relates to science of physics
At first - physics must evolve into new level of alchemistry on the spiral of knowledge (but lets hope it's not a simple spiral). We need new age of alchemistry - alchemistry tries to connect what is called
soul with what is called matter.
How this new alchemistry differs from physics?
In physics, the main task is to find simpler algorithms to explain more things. The exact language and symbolics of those algorithms is a free play. The fundamental target is to explain everything as one field and the ways we split things into different fields do not matter.
In this new alchemistry, the coal is wholly different. At first - one general field is not axiomatically preferred. In case it turns our that the cognitive experience is put together from things with very
different qualities, the barriers of fields run from those quality differences. The symbolism and language is set up in such way that we could actually understand the real cognitive processes going on in each case - for example, we could prove from such physics that some bacterian is or is not aware in some specific way; we could understand from physics of alien if they are conscious or not. Even if that alien does not have a nervous system similar to us.
And I see a lot of problems here - and, isn't the problems signs of a large body of undone work? Large body of undone work should have a big positive meaning; maybe the technology is not the only area to invest into right now. Maybe we have a science, where we could make new discoveries as fast as new fundamental discoveries of physics were done a century ago. It could produce new geniuses, new jobs and new business niches. A lot of positive.
I give you an outline to make understanding more exact and checking simpler.
- Kant told us that we can't possibly be sure in any thing-in-itself.
- Currently, this idea is developed into those axioms, widespread version of materialism:
- Measurement process with five senses or a device will measure the effects, not a thing.
- Everything we can measure is instant effects of the cause (shortly, cause) and other effects of this measured event (shortly, effect).
- Thus, no scientific theory can contain anything about things-in-themselves. Thus, we can't say anything about things-in-themselves.
- Thus, things-in-themselves do not exist. (which has minor logical conflict with the fact that they must exist)
- This kind of materialism is no way scientific theory in itself, because:
- This is an axiomatic system of modern science - a starting point. Before creators of this paradigm we hardly see anything as "science" in modern sense.
- This paradigm itself is non-falsifiable.
- As it's non-falsifiable and considered simple, it is the kind of thing where one can say "prove the
- The problem with it's non-falsifiability, where it conflicts with Poppers definition of science, is that it's non-falsifiable based on prime axioms of science, namely itself. It's a kind of theorem, which renders itself effectively non-falsifiable forever. One can't possibly disprove it. Thus it's pseudoscience.
- As a direct implication, as cause and effect are mathematical (they are mathematical theories), the mind must be mathematical complex. This is commonly believed among scientists, who believe in kantian claim about things-in-themselves.
- Proving that this claim is weak or contains a contradiction is also a proof that materialism as we know it - starting from kantian belief - is false. Thus, it disproves materialism.
- With self-reflection we can know something about mind - namely that it has some qualities. My hope is that we can take this fact as granted in world-view of big percentage of scientists. We have experiences and those experiences are what they are. They exist.
- A try to explain this fact about experiences is a theory of mind as mathematical system. This would have
- There is necessary and sufficient mathematical condition, which is identical with feeling.
- This condition can be modeled on computer - as with artifical intelligence - and the computer can be created from any material or working logic, this makes no difference. Thus, paper, pencil and hand-made calculations give us a sufficiently advanced computer to have all those effects.
- Given that point, thousand mathematicians knowing the calculation rules and calculating movements of quanta in human being and sharing some necessary information about forces between quanta calculated by them, would produce somewhere some very real human feeling, like pain.
- This claim is absurd.
- As the symbols might have different meanings, always having some functions, which leave results impact (calculation results are the same, what we could get without changing the meanings of symbols), those mathematical rules can not be precise.
- Thus, as there are always ways to interpret anything distributed over space in such way, that the interpretation gives us a pattern of emotion, the claim is absurd.
- We could defend it by stating that this thing must be in intelligent reaction in real world - anyway, if
we knew events in advance, even a gramophone could be intelligent.
- The latter would also mean that mathematical process in virtual reality would be not considered alive even if the machine executing it in real world would be.
- This is in no way simple explanation to anything. The hypotheses of mathematical condition.
- Thus, as the hypotheses is direct implication of Kantian belief, Kantian belief becomes unbelievable.
- If feelings were math construct, we should have some mathematical notions and tools to prove some
formula having a specific feeling. We don't. This claim that this is possible has no ground.
- By the way, experiences are not "just a fantasy", because fantasy is experience in itself.
- Bertrand Russel has stated in introduction of philosophy that all we know for sure is existence of experience. A good scientific theory should take this claim as granted - anyone can check it.
- Schopenhauer has given in his "world as will and idea" a plausible solution about things-in-themselves. Proven, I think, but in very complex way and a lot of hidden premises. Obfuscation must be removed.
- Claim that feelings are not mathematical construct will imply that they are physical construct (not claiming anything about the nature of this physical construct - I am not, specifically, stating that soul is or is not material).
- This means, there are physical conditions sufficient and necessary to have a feeling.
- As we can show feelings and talk about feelings, we must state an opposite of Kants claim, which implies that we could not - things-in-themselves are expressable.
- Thus, things-in-themselves have meaningful connection with causal events. And this has implications.
- We can use our will to change reality in ways we want. As will must be physical reality and this has effect, it implies:
- First possibility - the connection is given.
- Second possibility - the connection has evolutionary advantage.
- Those latter claims show the direct effects of understanding this simple thing - that feelings are material - as having serious consequences to our science and it's measurements, which is not only a "theoretical question". The philosophical ground helps in many ways to reconstruct our paradigm.